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CONTENTS

INTER-AFAB AFFAIRS

Fatah Official Advocates Confrontation Versus United States, Reactionaries (Abu-Salih; AL-SAFIR, 17-20 Dec 80).....	1
FDP's Moellmann Meets With 'Arafat, Urges PLO Recognition (DPA, 13 Mar 81).....	28
Palestine National Council Speaker Addresses Algiers Conference (Khalid al-Fahum; ASH-SHA'B, 10 Mar 81).....	29
Gulf Independence Emphasized (ARAB NEWS, 9 Mar 81).....	31
Briefs PLO Representative, Soviet Ambassador Meet Security Cooperation Discussed	32 32

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Terror Claims More Civilian Victims (Erich Wiedemann; DER SPIEGEL, 2 Mar 81).....	33
---	----

BAHRAIN

Briefs Canadian Industry Minister Visits	39
---	----

EGYPT

Law Issued Establishing National Railroad Authority (AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, 14 Jul 80).....	40
Law Establishes National Telecommunications Authority (AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, 14 Jul 80).....	48

IRAN

Tudeh Party Congratulatory Message to Khomeyni (MARDOM, 10 Feb 81).....	56
Tudeh Party Denial of Delivery of Soviet Arms to Iraq (MARDOM, 7 Feb 81).....	57
Qasemlu Said To Have 'Joined With Bakhtiar' (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 21 Feb 81).....	61
Creation of Groups, Manipulation of Groups Examined (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 3 Mar 81).....	63

JORDAN

Paper Details 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan (Janab Tutunji; JORDAN TIMES, 19 Mar 81).....	65
---	----

KUWAIT

Briefs Iranians Support Khomeyni	69
-------------------------------------	----

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Briefs Agricultural Cooperation	70
------------------------------------	----

SAUDI ARABIA

Documentary Aims To Correct Misinformation About Country (ARAB NEWS, 5-6 Mar 81).....	71
--	----

SUDAN

Opposition Students Meet in Manchester (AL-DUSTUR, 19-25 Jan 81).....	73
Sugar Growers' Strike Highlights Problems in Sugar Industry (Usamah Sayyid 'Abd-al-Aziz; AL-AYYAM, 25, 26 Jan 81).....	76

SULTANATE OF OMAN

PFLO Regaining Momentum After 1975-1976 Setback (('Abd al-Hafiz Jum'an Interview; SAWT AL-THAWRAH, 1 Feb 81)....	87
--	----

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Briefs Meeting With Eritrean Official	92
Libyan Message Conveyed	92
Oil Minister in Riyadh	92

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH OFFICIAL ADVOCATES CONFRONTATION VERSUS UNITED STATES, REACTIONARIES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 17, 18, 19 & 20 Dec 80

[Article by Abu-Salih, Fatah Central Committee Member and al-'Asifah Forces General Command Member: "United States and Us; Middle East: Central Link in U.S. Policy"]

[17 Dec 80, p 13]

[Text] Why These Articles?

What urges me to write to the public opinion now is that the world and the Arabs, and we in the Palestinian revolution in particular, need to look at a number of international developments that have cropped up in the past 2 years to readjust our positions, to get to the roots of the requirements needed to preserve our survival and to realize our strategic goals, taking into consideration not only the local developments but also the international changes that move the policies of the major powers and their allies while maintaining our unshakable faith that the strength of any political movement in this world depends fundamentally on the intrinsic ability of this movement and then, and only then, on the number of successful alliances which this movement establishes to translate its struggle program and through which the movement reaches the map of world struggle, affecting and influencing it.

Therefore, we in the Arab area, and particularly in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, are required to establish [tajdhir] our political, economic and social position, required to look carefully in order to know how matters around us move and required to approach things and to call them by their names. The ongoing struggle between the national and progressive states and forces on the one hand and the imperialist and reactionary forces on the other hand bears two possibilities only: Either confrontation or a defeatist accumulation that will bring our Arab nation nothing but catastrophe.

It is time for us to realize that this struggle is influenced by and influences the international struggle. This is why we should ask: Where do our interests, as an Arab nation, lie? How do we manage the struggle movement to translate our principles and our people's interests and how do we translate all our slogans into actual realities which we practice.

Here I say that we must prove with action, and to the calculations of both the major and the minor powers, that we are a power that influences the course of the future

events and that matters will not be set aright in our area except by changing the area's present map according to our capable power, else imperialism will be able to realize its program in the area--a program that also relies on effecting further change in the area in the interest of this imperialism. This is what we hear daily from Ronald Reagan, the newcomer to the White House, and from numerous U.S. leaders and officials.

There are numerous political forces in the third world that have lost their existence or realized their programs quickly. The failure or success of these forces has depended on their understanding of the course of affairs and of their accurate comprehension of the process of the struggle going around them--a struggle controlled by several parties and led by the major powers and states.

This is why the political leadership's knowledge of the intricacies of the struggle, its awareness of the details of all matters, both big and small, affecting and influencing its interests and its understanding of the courses of the events and of the developments of the struggle which is controlled by the major powers are inevitable for developing the revolution's course. Here emerges the role of experience. A successful leadership is the leadership that benefits from its experience and development. Experience is a guide that may not be forgotten or disregarded. In addition to clinging to the principles, which are tantamount to the interest of a nation rebelling against its situation, the personal qualities of the leadership play an important and prominent role.

To judge any leadership and to measure its movement in managing the struggle, experience leads us to the need to differentiate between managing the struggle to achieve the nation's national interests and managing the struggle to realize the leadership's own goals, to enhance its role and to bolster its control. Perhaps it is redundant to stress here that managing the struggle with the aim of realizing the nation's interests leads constantly to the clarity of opinion and to taking courageous initiatives and, consequently, to firm decisions whereas managing the struggle with the aim of realizing selfish interests leads to maneuvering, trickery and avoiding confrontation and this leads to concessions given by the leadership at the expense of the revolution's assets. Catastrophes have frequently befallen peoples because of continued concessions at the expense of the revolution's assets and because of the fear of confrontation.

On the basis of this perspective, these articles deal with the current Arab situation from a viewpoint characterized by two things:

1. It is a personal viewpoint.
2. Yet, it reflects one of the present currents in discussing these issues, be it within the Palestinian revolution, in the circles of the Pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front or in the circles of the Arab liberation movement and its forces generally.

The goal that these articles, in their capacity as an address to the public opinion from a [man in a] position not required to make such an address, seek is to persuade of the need for the public opinion to take part in the ongoing debate and discussion in circles concerned with the decision-making.

The Arab policy generally, from its various conservative, reactionary, national, radical or progressive positions, deals with the United States on the basis of a tacit admission [musallamah], namely that the United States enjoys overwhelming international superiority in the first place and enjoys superiority in the so-called Middle East and that this superiority affects the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East as it affects the position of the Arab liberation forces. What distinguishes the approach of the different Arab positions toward the United States is that both conservatives and reactionaries translate this tacit admission into a policy of joining the United States while the nationalists, radicals and progressive forces translate the same tacit admission at various levels that have nothing to do with the admission. These nationalists, radicals or progressives establish their policies somewhere between two positions, with the more distant position being one of wishing to be able to exert pressure on the United States (by way of oil or by way of Europe) in the hope that it may change its policy and the nearer position being one of not provoking the United States and of persuading her to re-interpret its policy with an Arab tendency.

The malady of the Arab policy lies on the national, progressive or radical side in particular, because it is this side of the policy that concerns us. The weakness of the Arab policy lies in the fact that it proceeds on the premise of this tacit admission.

It is time for this admission to be discussed.

Imperialism's need for change in the area in order to continue its control, influence and domination of the area's destiny is as much as our need for change in the opposite direction so that we may realize our nation's national and progressive goals.

Imperialism is pushing for change day after day. With its intensifying economic crisis, imperialism is rushing with greater ferocity to overcome its dilemma, gathering behind it its allies in Western Europe. Isn't this what Joseph Sisco, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state, expressed (in statements he made at the end of 1979 which were published by most papers and circulated by the wire services) when he said: "The United States must face the dilemma by formulating a new and quick economic plan. This plan should rely on the unity of the United States and its West European allies." It is needless to point out here that any new US economic plan will by necessity take into consideration this area which is important in terms of oil, strategically and even geographically.

In the same statements, Sisco acknowledged the Soviet Union's strategic superiority over the United States--a superiority that requires the United States to allocate vast funds for the armament policy in an attempt to catch up with the Soviets. This is something that further intensifies the U.S. economic crisis.

United States and Its Economic Crisis

Here, one can understand the U.S. approval of SALT II which calls for stopping the production of strategic weapons, for limiting what is stored of such weapons, for turning toward solving the more complex international problems, for continuing the policy of peaceful coexistence and for confronting the international economic crisis of capitalism under the canopy of this policy of coexistence. But the United States

has continued to face its economic crisis. The strategic superiority of the socialist forces and the victories scored by the third world countries have made the United States hysterical. I will note here the great victory scored by the Iranian people, in addition to the national and progressive steadfastness of the Arab peoples, as well as the progressive victories of the African peoples. All this intensified the state of hysteria in the United States to the degree which has brought Ronald Reagan to power. The attainment of this power by the movie actor who became famous for his cowboy roles and who is well-known for his intransigence and inflexibility is a clear reflection which contains plain indications of the crisis under which imperialism is living. At the end of Carter's term, the U.S. administration made up its mind and followed the course of intransigence and inflexibility which has brought Reagan to power so that he may lead in the role of ending the third world's rebellion and may realize economic and military unity with Western Europe (as reflected by Sisco).

The U.S. course developing at the end of Carter's term believes that solving the economic crisis to catch up with the Soviet Union depends on two axes: An axis seeking to realize economic unity and a common plan with Europe and an axis seeking to control the rebellious third world and using all the means to do so. This is why the U.S. administration resorted at the end of Carter's term to preparing for the expected onslaught, led by Reagan, to impose its policy on Europe. The story of the U.S. Pershing missile, a missile which the United States exerted pressure to deploy in a number of European countries, is nothing but a reflection of this U.S. determination to drag Europe into a common position with the United States.

As long as there is a missile that can be launched from Moscow to Washington and a missile that can be launched from Washington to Moscow, what is the purpose of deploying these medium-range [Pershing] missiles in Europe? Isn't the political and economic, and not the military, goal that is behind all this? This becomes more certain when we learn that the European countries that are completely subservient to the United States are the ones that have responded [positively] to the deployment of the missiles whereas the countries that still respect themselves and that still try to preserve their independence have their reservations over the deployment of these missiles until this moment.

Control of Third World

On the other axis, the United States has moved to control the rebellious third world. This movement was evident in al-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity--a visit urged and arranged by the Americans with the aim of reaching a solution for the most explosive problem, namely the Middle East problem whose crux is the Palestinian problem. In this respect, peace--even the U.S.-Israeli peace--was not so much the goal as was, according to statements made by U.S., Israeli and Egyptian officials, the creation of a US Arab-Israeli alliance so that this alliance may perform a common effective and final role in deterring the third world (as Sisco said) and in fighting the socialist forces whose ideological influence and impact has been rising daily.

The U.S. administration thinks only of its interests. It is worried and it thinks nervously. The development of the international conditions and circumstances reveals clearly the continued struggle in the (United States). The United States is afraid to lose its prestige as a major power and is thus rushing toward a radicalism

that may motivate it to embark on adventures, especially since the ghost of its defeat in Iran, Afghanistan and Nicaragua is still evident throughout the area and is surprising the United States here and there. For the United States, the Middle East is the black gem and the United States is not content with the Arab wealth that it is getting but is demanding more. It demands the entire Arab wealth and is seeking to recruit and use the Arabs as slaves fighting on its side and against the socialist forces to preserve the U.S. interests.

To realize its goals, imperialism refuses to acknowledge the reality and the facts embodied by the 20th century man. It wants to turn history backward and wants to efface revolutions and to suppress victories embodied in the struggle of the peoples who have liberated themselves from colonialism and the oppression of imperialism. Imperialism, which has been compelled to retreat in the face of these peoples' struggles, is now trying anew to return to its previous position, disregarding the fact that the world of freedom and progress is now bolstered by the strength of strategic superiority and not by that of propaganda.

This is why the U.S. fear of the future exists. Because the United States is forced to deal with the facts, most plain of which are the facts that the Arab land is for the Arabs, the wealth of the Arab land belongs to the Arab peoples, that the Arab will only fight to serve his interests and that Zionism is an abnormal force on our Arab soil, the U.S. anxiety will only intensify and the United States will continue to move toward its crisis.

The decisive battle has begun. This U.S. radicalism which is worried about the future will not intimidate us. Rather, it will encourage us to be more and more optimistic that the victory is more imminent than we have imagined. The issue is tied to the next 4 years and to whether Reagan will succeed or not. In other words, will the radicals in the United States succeed? Will the wish of Zionism be realized on the hands of Reagan or will the next 4 years be tantamount to the final lesson to imperialism, a lesson that teaches it to acknowledge against its will the accomplishments of the age, especially the rights of the persecuted?

In view of the fact that imperialism's urgent issue is that of solving the economic problem, the decisive battle will take place in the Middle East. This is why the United States is seeking to realize everything in the Middle East first. The few who are beyond its control, represented by the steadfastness and confrontation forces, cause the United States--with their present and their future--greater anxiety than the reassurance that the many, embodied in the reactionary forces, give it. The future of the steadfastness [force] requires that it deal with the interests of peoples more seriously and responsibly. This will strengthen the objective international circumstance against the U.S. policy. What I mean here is that the continued efforts of some European countries to preserve their independence, along with continued Soviet superiority, will bolster the growth of the Arab national forces and will, consequently, push in the direction of greater Arab economic and political liberation. With his anxiety and his awareness, Sisco addressed this particular point (in his interview with AL-HAWADITH, the edition before last) when he urged the United States to send military forces to protect the oil wells "for fear of the future growth and development of the radical forces."

Middle East Is Central Link

Therefore, the Middle East is the next central link in the U.S. policy. The battle started with what Reagan declared during his election campaign. The ongoing dialogue in some Arab circles regarding Reagan's statements and the endeavors to portray these statements as talk intended to win the election battle without reflecting the U.S. policy under Reagan's administration is an incorrect dialogue. Those who engage in this dialogue with such a logic are agents who distort the fact, or let us say that they are, at best, naive people who are shortsighted politically.

What Reagan declared during his election campaign was the result of dialogue, and even the result of struggle within the ruling U.S. establishment--a struggle which escalated and intensified in the last months preceding the election. Anxiety leads to either acknowledging the de facto situation, as de Gaulle did when he acknowledged Algeria's independence to save France, or to radicalism with its potential for adventurism--an adventurism which is undoubtedly coming, for which we must make every calculation and which we must prepare to confront with all our weapons.

Judgement Before Practice

Reagan issued his sentence--"no to the revolutionary Palestinian presence currently and no to the Palestinian state in the future"--against us even before he assumed his office officially. Here is the effect of Reagan's unofficial statements casting its shadow on the policies of the Arab states and here are the reactionary states siding with the United States at the expense of the Arab nation's interests and the Palestinian people's interests. The statements of Reagan, who hasn't yet assumed office, have motivated the reactionary Arabs to rush to the Amman [summit] conference in order to erase the revolutionary Palestinian presence and the future entity of the Palestinian people. The symbol of these reactionaries is al-Sadat. When al-Sadat projected the need for the coexistence of religions and went aboard his plane to the Zionist entity, he did so with the approval of the Arab reaction, embodied by King Hassan II, who was the godfather of al-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity and who undertook this role as the result of consultations and discussions with the other reactionary symbols.

When Brzezinski declared the need to speed up a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to make it possible to set up a U.S.-Arab-Israeli alliance in the face of socialism, he was giving the fiercest Arab reactionaries the go-ahead sign to camouflage their goals with the slogan of "confronting the imaginary communist danger." Al-Sadat picked up the sign and went to the Zionist entity, with facilities and arrangements supervised by Morocco's king. Thus, al-Sadat was the first to fall. But al-Sadat is not the first and the last. Aren't the reactionaries coming on the [same] path forming a waiting line?

I believe that they are waiting in line. If the Americans have permitted al-Sadat to argue with them, then there are Arab regimes that are not even allowed to argue. However, their role has been postponed as part of the U.S. plan. This role will be played by these regimes, led by Saudi Arabia, when the United States changes the area's conditions in accordance with its premeditated plans.

As the pro-U.S. European countries received the slogan of tying Europe to the United States militarily (Pershing missiles and bases), with only a few self-respecting

countries opposing this slogan, the pro-U.S. Arabs have earnestly picked up the slogan of the U.S.-Arab-Israeli alliance to confront the alleged communist danger whereas the Arabs who respect their honor, preserve their independence and are concerned with the interests of their peoples, led by the Palestinian revolution, have opposed this slogan.

But the Arab rejection here differs in its motives from the European rejection. Whereas the European rejection focuses on the European countries' preservation and enhancement of their economic interests in freedom from the U.S. domination and on the protection and development of these interests, especially with the third world and the socialist countries, thus acknowledging the accomplishments of the age and displaying the preparedness to acknowledge the facts of the age, we find that the Arab rejection is backed not only by the Arab nation's interests but also by the issue of the entire existence of this nation. Therefore, we view the French as more Arab--if we view Arabism by the criterion of the interests that can be realized for the Arab nation--than the pro-U.S. Arabs.

These pro-U.S. Arabs are the representatives of imperialist forces who head certain Arab regimes and who cannot hide behind the slogan of liberating Palestine (all of Palestine). They are the ones who opposed 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Arab left and they are the ones who have, since 1975, worked to solve the Palestinian problem within the Camp David framework by their slogan of "no to a phased solution."

The reactionaries and the agents deserve no more than this characterization. This is their role and they carry out the orders given to them. There are those who say that the reactionaries have made up their mind on the basis of an ideological position. I tell these people that even this charge is far from the truth because the ignorant agents have no ideological affiliation.

Imperialism has determined its position vis-a-vis the Arab liberation movement and the reactionaries have responded. If the honor of being the first to make up one's mind has escaped the Arab liberation movement, then this movement has something to compensate it in this regard, namely work for the honor of victory. This victory cannot be realized without reliance on political clarity and on responding to the masses' demands.

Camp David has not realized its goals, the Zionist enemy has not given al-Sadat any strategic concession and the Israeli forces are still behind the passes in the Sinai and are still militarily prepared to confront any changes in the Egyptian policy--a military coup against al-Sadat, for example. As for the Israeli withdrawal which has taken place within the Camp David framework, it is no more than a political (opening) meant for propaganda for al-Sadat and no more than a worthless civilian (opening) because withdrawal from al-'Arish is a withdrawal from positions that are behind the Israeli forces' strategic positions. Israel will not withdraw from the Sinai until the Palestinian issue is settled according to the U.S.-Israeli solution.

Therefore, Camp David has realized no more than the fall of al-Sadat as an agent of the United States and an ally of Israel. Al-Sadat's fall and the results realized by the Camp David accord have not stirred the conscience of the reactionary states. On the contrary, we find that the Saudi minister of foreign affairs states at the Amman conference: "We, the Arabs, cannot go to war. Therefore, a peaceful solution must be realized through the United States. Reagan is the best man to rule the

United States." What do these statements mean other than capitulation, joining al-Sadat and handing the keys to the entire Arab area to the United States and Israel? These statements have coincided with what Ezer Weizman said in his interview with NEWSWEEK on 15 December, namely: "Saudi Arabia must realize that it has to ultimately side with the United States and Europe. Ultimately, the Saudis will find a way with al-Sadat. If there is any ray of hope of realizing this, then I believe that we should assist them," meaning that Israel supports Saudi Arabia.

[18 Dec 80, p 11]

[Text] Reagan has declared that he will solve the Middle East problem in 1981. In his press interviews, Sisco has said that 1982 will witness peace in the Middle East and the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. It is my belief that both Reagan and Sisco have been wagering on the Arab reactionaries and on the decision which they were to wrest from the Amman conference after having failed to wrench it from the Tunis conference. In the Amman conference, King Husayn projected the need for an Arab peace initiative. President Numayri followed suit and stressed the need to form a joint Arab delegation to hold dialogue with the United States in order to reach this initiative. President Saddam Husayn agreed, stressing that his country, which has no diplomatic relations with the United States, had no objection if the Arabs deem this necessary. It seemed at the time [when these views were expressed] that the matter had been prearranged and that the roles had been already divided. For the sake of the truth and of history, al-Asad has rejected the formation of a unified delegation for dialogue with the United States and has said that he sees no benefit in such a dialogue, even though Syria has diplomatic relations with the United States, because the U.S. position is, as al-Asad has said, declared and well-known. But if some Arab countries which have diplomatic relations with the United States want to engage in bilateral dialogue with it, then he has no objection [al-Asad has said]. The Arab goals are clear and approved in Arab summit conference. The Palestinian position in this regard was made clear in Tunis, and so was the position of the steadfastness states. The reactionaries retreated and began to prepare for the Amman conference with all their resources. I must point out here that the reactionaries' retreat was not only the result of the position of the steadfastness and confrontation forces but also the result of the fact that the United States had not taken a firm position. At the time, the United States was still working along two axes: The axis of a European initiative launched by the pro-U.S. Europeans and supported by the Arab states--an initiative through which preparations were to be made for an international conference in which Europe, the Arab States, Israel and some Palestinians were to participate. The other axis was that of an Arab initiative to be supported by the European countries. Romanian President Ceausescu, who had suddenly turned from an advocate of the European initiative to an advocate of the Arab initiative, called for this Arab initiative on the urging of the U.S. administration.

If we still hear voices calling for the European initiative, it is because these voices have not yet learned that the United States has made up its mind and that it is awaiting an Arab initiative, supported by Europe, as an inlet to the solution in accordance with the U.S. concept and the Israeli visualization. This axis--the Arab initiative--is what made the Arab reactionaries hasten to call for making the Amman conference a success as soon as Reagan won and began to make his threats. In their call for the success of this conference, the Arabs relied on the shattered Arab

situation and on the new reality created by Iraq's war against Iran. All this was done with the goal of enabling King Husayn to go to the United States to sign the capitulation contract, on the grounds that Jordan represents the Palestinians, through the initiative toward Europe first and then the United States.

The nervous state under which the seven-member committee and the foreign ministers conference met in Amman reminds me of what a minister from the Arab Maghreb has said in the course of discussing the policy of the Middle Eastern states. This minister said: "They still think with the bedouin mentality. When a bedouin wanted to steal in old times, he would wait for night to descend, put out the lights and advise the others not to put out their lights because there was a thief around. They, added the minister from the Arab Maghreb, want to steal your existence and your rights to Palestine and advise you at the same time not to remain silent and not to put out the lights of the revolution."

They wanted to steal the future of the Palestinian people and of the Arab masses before the truth of the situation of the Iraq-Iran war could become clear to the eyes. In this war, the United States wagered on exploiting the Iraqi ambitions in its interest and expected to reap from this war the corpse of the Iranian revolution --and this is something that would enable the United States to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and would bring success to the Camp David policy on the Palestinian soil, with the support of Jordan. I recall here that it is in the records that I said in the latest Steadfastness and Confrontation conference in the presence of the six heads of the steadfastness states that Iraq was preparing to launch war against Iran. I projected this possibility months before the war and without having any information of plans for this war. It was a reading of the scheme.

But the Americans have been surprised by the fact that the imam (Khomeyni) has stood fast, that the armed struggle in the Gulf is proceeding in accordance with the will and terms of Khomeyni and that matters are becoming more complicated in the face of the master coming to the White House. The U.S. administration has thus made a nervous and hasty attempt to reap the fruits at the Amman conference before the external crisis could turn into a direct crisis for the United States and the reactionary Arab states and also before it could turn into an intensifying concern for Western Europe which is directly harmed by the Gulf war. This is what urges some of these European countries toward further disagreement, rather than agreement, with the common [U.S.] plan. This fact may be exploited in the interest of the national Arab states and the PLO rather than the interest of the reactionary states. This U.S.-reactionary apprehension is what has motivated the Saudi minister of foreign affairs to say that the Amman conference goals are clear, namely to assign King Husayn, in the name of all the Arabs, to talk with the United States. This fear is also what motivated the minister to say before the holding of the summit that "the United States and Europe expect the summit to be held on schedule."

Therefore, the goals are clear and the fear is legitimate. America and its Arabs are wagering on the fragmentation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and on tricking the Palestinians to acknowledge the status quo. Perhaps this explains the [secret] balloting which took place in a meeting of foreign ministers for the first time.

In the last days of the summit, they dropped from their consideration the Syrian position and, consequently, the Syrian presence, because what is required is to isolate and topple Syria in the following stage. This is why they focused on the Palestinian presence as the presence of the people concerned and as a presence to cover up

their schemes. The Palestinian presence would have foiled the effectiveness of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Consequently, the importance of whoever attended or failed to attend from this front would have been diminished. This is why the Palestinian position was important and why this position was as it has always been and not as they wished it or imagined it to be.

Effectiveness of Syrian Treaty

By concluding the recent treaty with the Soviet Union, Syria has bolstered its positions and its fundamental role in the conflict, and here lies the strategic importance of this treaty. For the Syrian-Soviet treaty to be effective in leadership and in continuing the struggle against Zionism and imperialism, the Palestinian issue must be its central issue because what is the value of a Syria possessing trans-continental missiles if such possession is outside the framework of the central issue. Absence of the Palestinian action paralyzes Syria's movement and narrows the sphere of its pan-Arab responsibility.

The alert and courageous Palestinian position foiled the opportunity of the pro-U.S. Arabs. Rather, this position, which has been bolstered with the positions of the other parties in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, led by Syria, has moved the pro-U.S. Arabs from the position of the rash offensive to the position of quiet defense.

The Central Committee meeting held in Damascus on 24 November 1980 underlined important reasons for the decision not to take part in the Amman summit.

Organization's Non-Participation

The absence of the organization [PLO] and of the other parties of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front will compel the United States to retreat quickly [rest of sentence indecipherable]. This will make it easier for us to confront the U.S. scheme and, consequently, will enable us to realize major goals in the Arab area in our struggle against these outdated regimes. Moreover, the unity of the Palestinian position abroad reflects the unity of all the Palestinian forces inside the occupied territories and this unity constitutes the impenetrable dam in the face of any movement by King Husayn and his partner al-Sadat in any attempt to solve the Palestinian problem at the expense of our people. Thus, the decision [not to take part in Amman summit] was taken, the goals of the Amman summit died and the United States lost its opportunity in the Amman summit.

Reagan, and behind him those who are eager to save the United States and its prestige, were attributing major significance to the Amman conference and to the results required of it in the Middle East. Else, why did Reagan say that the solution will take place in 1981? Was this confidence based on noticeable facts? Any observer of the U.S. policy for the last year realizes the foolishness of this policy which has been emerging from one dilemma only to fall into another. It is the start of the countdown for the United States itself. The real crisis of the United States is the growing freedom and development of the peoples of the so-called third world. Foremost of these demands [presumably of the third world] are the freedom, unity and liberation of the Arab nation and the liberation of Palestine from the Zionist control.

The liberation of any part of the world takes place at the expense of the United States and of the world imperialist forces. The growing liberation of the third world peoples in the past 5 years is what has led the United States to its strategic dilemma.

The Iranian revolution is the earthquake, the Arab steadfastness forces, embodied in the Steadfastness Front parties and led by the PLO, are the facade of the continued struggle and the possibility of introducing changes in the Arab area in the interest of liberation movement is now more imminent than ever before.

Therefore, the race between the United States and the Middle East confrontation forces from Tehran to Aden is a race within the context of confrontation. The failure of Iraq's war against Iran, with all its consequences, has worsened America's crisis and the failure of the Amman summit has bolstered this crisis.

Two Possibilities Before Reagan

I can say that Reagan's declared policy has died before he has assumed his presidency officially. The failure of the Amman summit has put Reagan before two possibilities for imposing his policy:

Either prevaricate through new slogans to get a unified Arab position bolstering the role of the Arab reactionaries' leadership in the area. This requires flexibility and special tactics to guarantee its success and requires a time span that may go beyond 1982 and not 1981, as Reagan has said.

This policy will fail. Prevarication, maneuvering and endeavors on the part of the Arab reaction to beautify the ugly U.S. face require more time. Such a policy can only end with further bolstering of the positions of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and, consequently, with the preservation of this front and with developing it politically, economically, militarily and socially.

Or, and this is the second possibility, the United States can embark on military action. Such action may be carried out with U.S. forces or with local forces with the aim of changing by force the positions of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front parties and of Iran and the aim of realizing the goals quickly so as to prevent rallying behind the "national cause which all the Arabs and Muslims support." The priority of such a scheme would be to destroy the Palestinian resistance and Syria quickly because this would weaken the other steadfastness forces and would prepare the path for destroying them. The United States may also try to develop the ongoing military conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara. It may also work with all its resources to put an end to the Gulf war or, on the other hand, to intensify it militarily by introducing into it new forces to defeat Iran and to restore it to the U.S. hold. Should the conflict develop in the interest of the Iranian revolution, the United States may perhaps send U.S. forces to the oil sources in order to be able to protect whichever of its interests can be saved. This is what Sisco, the [former] U.S. official, referred to in his recent interview with AL-HAWADITH when he said: "We may send forces to the oil sources to protect our interests from the influence of the radical forces," as he has called them. But the dispatch of such forces means further intensification of the U.S. crisis. Besides, the dispatch of these forces may require a long time because it depends on

what results the Iraq-Iran war may produce. The dispatch of U.S. quick-intervention [presumably meaning rapid deployment] units to Kuwait or Abu Dhabi, for example, will not be in the interest of the imperialist forces, even if the forces are sent as a precaution against a crushing victory that may be realized by the Iranian revolution. In such a case, the presence of these forces will be between Khomeyni's hammer and the Arab liberation movement's anvil. The Iranian revolution, with the leadership of Khomeyni and with its blazing slogans for the defense of the interests of the poor and for liberating Jerusalem, along with the Arab liberation movement, led by the PLO and the parties of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, are capable of expelling (defeating) the U.S. forces from the Gulf with force. Here, the Palestinian resistance and Syria remain as the urgent and immediate strategic issue. The possibility of launching a military attack from Jordan or Iraq, for example, against Syria is not expected in the near or distant future. Rather, there is fear in Jordan that Syria will embark on such action because the regime in Jordan is condemned and doesn't possess the ability to stand fast in the face of Syria. Moreover, this regime does not have the support of the people and its task is to arrest 1.5 million Palestinians in Jordan who will offer roses to the Syrian forces if they were to attack Jordan and intervene to topple the Jordanian monarchic regime.

What other possibilities are there? Will the United States resort to sending quick-intervention forces to Syria? This will not be realistic and will not enable the United States to overcome its crisis. Rather, it will compound this crisis. Therefore, there remains the possibility of Israel overrunning Lebanon and dealing Syria a fatal military blow that makes Syria capitulate as a consequence. Such a possibility continues to be present to the White House rulers but are its results guaranteed and will it realize the U.S. goal?

This is actually the most likely possibility on which and around which all the calculations must revolve. The public reports of western observers and the Syrian officials' statements say that Syria has realized military balance with the Zionist enemy. This balance has been realized by virtue of the growth of the Syrian-Soviet friendship which was recently crowned with the Syrian-Soviet treaty that contains the principle of bolstering Syria's defenses to repel any foreign aggression. It is my belief that in the short run and the long run, what is required to defeat the U.S. policy is no more than bolstering Syria's steadfastness in the face of any attempt by the Israeli army to occupy Syrian territories. This ability to stand fast is present in the form of the Syrian resources and of whatever expected or unexpected Arab aid may be given to Syria in case of an Israeli invasion because the Arab and public conscience will not withstand such occupation and many will be compelled to rush to the rescue of Syria. We should add to this the fact that Syria's steadfastness has already been bolstered by the new treaty and by what may be given to Syria by the Soviet Union--the leader of the world liberation parties--in any future battle or in case it is subjected to such an aggression. Any U.S.-supported Israeli attempt to deal Syria a military blow by way of Lebanon will be subject to careful calculation by both imperialism and Zionism. Such a decision constitutes a venture with no guaranteed consequences, will topple numerous forces in the area and will put the liberation movement before a new historic course. In Damascus, President Hafiz al-Asad is only 50 kilometers away from the frontline with the Zionist enemy army and there remains the fact that he was forced [in 1973 war] to transfer his command to Aleppo. There also remains the Arab cause and the continued struggle movement, even though this possibility is very unlikely [sic.]

Lebanon and Development of Struggle

Peace in the area will be established by its peoples and not by the reactionary rulers. This is something that the United States understands perfectly well. The United States doesn't want peace and is fighting time to control the area and to save itself. The United States is the side which created the conflict in Lebanon. Lebanon and its problem will continue to be an element of blackmail against the Arab states and an inlet for activating the role of the Israeli forces against Syria and the Palestinian resistance. The situation in Lebanon may be the result of the waver of the Arab reactionary forces and of their continued endeavors to sow discord among the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Lebanese in an attempt to destroy the Palestinian-Syrian alliance and to focus on the particular aspect of bolstering the Lebanese legitimacy in order to devoid Lebanon of its national Lebanese and Palestinian and, consequently, Syrian content. In such a case, Syria will lose its effectiveness in confronting the immediate U.S. policy, and the Amman summit resolutions did touch on this. Such an outcome is also not realistic. The Palestinian forces, as well as the Lebanese national forces and Syria, are aware of the goals of such a demand and are capable of foiling such a scheme. The Lebanese problem, as well as the Lebanese civil war, are a problem created by the United States and Israel. But the outcome of this problem has been contrary to what both imagined. As a result of this civil war, the Lebanese problem has become a part of the Middle East problem. Any attempt to separate the Lebanese problem from the Middle East problem is an attempt seeking to impose a U.S. solution at the expense of Lebanon and of the Palestinians.

In the wake of all the developments it has undergone during the 2-year war and since then, Lebanon has become tied to the Middle East problem. This result has not so much realized a Palestinian demand, contrary to what some people claim, as it has been the outcome of national Lebanese action. Saving Lebanon from partition, from the Israeli influence and from changing its political and geographic map requires a Lebanese national axis and an Arab axis to do the saving and to preserve Lebanon's Arabism and sovereignty.

This fact did not exist objectively before the 2-year war. Practically, Lebanon is fragmented and life in it is proceeding under the canopy of the frozen conflict. The presence of the Syrian forces plays an important role in this freezing process.

Today's Lebanon is different from yesterday's Lebanon. In addition to the national changes that have taken place on its soil with the armament of the Lebanese national masses, there is another fact, namely that while the isolationist forces talk about freezing the conflict, they are making preparation for fighting, and so are the national forces. Each of these forces is awaiting the development of the struggle over Lebanon in the Arab arena to pounce on the other. While the national Lebanese forces and the Palestinian resistance are exerting efforts to change the balance of forces concerning Lebanon in their favor, the isolationist forces, supported by Israel and the reactionary forces, are also working to change the balance in their favor. Israel aspires to control all of Lebanon. Therefore, what is required is not only Lebanon as territory but primarily Lebanon as a graveyard for the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement in order to embalm the Arab role of Syria. Therefore, what is required is only to bolster the continued presence of these Lebanese national forces and Palestinian forces on the Lebanese soil. It is

not all required to develop the conflict and intensify the confrontation with the isolationist forces. What is required is to bolster the national presence and to enhance its effectiveness in the Arab liberation movement in order to save both Palestine and Lebanon. Else, both Lebanon and Palestine will be lost.

The national solution lies in realizing an effective Arab capability that brings about the required change which forces the Americans to retreat and to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nation. Such a defeat to the U.S. policy constitutes, under the present reality, the only hope for saving Lebanon and Palestine.

[19 Dec 80, p 13]

[Text] The intensifying U.S. dilemma in the wake of the Amman summit has disappointed the hopes of many of the reactionaries and of the isolationist forces tied to Israel and has eliminated the chances of changing the reality in favor of realizing their plans. Will they continue to keep the conflict in Lebanon frozen or will they resort to launching war against the national Lebanese and the Palestinians?

To my belief, this is the question around which the U.S. administration's current calculations revolve.

The military reality in Lebanon is in favor of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national forces. With their intrinsic resources, the isolationist forces can change nothing in this reality. Consequently, these isolationist forces will not embark on such a war without an external U.S.-Israeli-reactionary push. Should this happen, the steadfastness parties, which are capable of settling the conflict in Lebanon in their favor militarily, may be forced to do so, especially since we do not exclude the likelihood of the isolationist forces embarking on isolationist-Israeli action on the Lebanese soil.

There is also another likelihood, namely that Israel launch a military offensive to occupy a part or all of southern Lebanon. Will such action change the U.S. position in the Middle East? No. It is estimated strategically that such a decision, unless aimed against Syria ultimately, will only intensify the U.S. dilemma. Such action would eliminate, insofar as the Arab and world public opinion is concerned, the possibility of hiding behind Camp David as a way for solving the Middle East problem.

Moreover, the presence of the joint forces--whether in al-Nabatiyah, Sidon, Beirut or Latakia--is capable of keeping contact with the enemy and the fight against him uninterrupted.

Fighting from Beauforte Castle is the same as fighting from the outskirts of Sidon and the hills of Beirut. Even if the fighting reaches Baghdad by way of Latakia, should the Israeli forces advance, the U.S. dilemma will continue to be present.

What is important is that the cause survive and that the people support it with all their resources, relying ultimately on the Arab steadfastness forces. The Palestinian depth is the entire Arab arena. The armed Palestinian presence, along with the armed fraternal Lebanese people, has become with its rights and its existence an objective reality which only the United States and Israel ignore. It will not be

long before these two acknowledge this reality. Therefore, an Israeli movement to occupy southern Lebanon will be subject to careful calculations. It is my estimate that such a movement, unless aimed against Damascus, is not likely. Damascus is beyond Israel's reach under the present circumstances and now that Damascus has settled its political position recently by developing its alliance with the Soviet Union. Moreover, any future Arab-Israeli war in the light of the recent international and Arab changes will not be in favor of Israel and those who are behind it.

Under the canopy of the fierce ongoing struggle between the hostile United States and friendly Soviet Union and under the canopy of the entrenchment of the Arab political position after the long suffering undergone by the Arab liberation movement from the early 1950's and until the present, the future war will require armed and vigilant masses mobilized in a clear and decisive political manner in all the confrontation states and the steadfastness and confrontation parties as much as it will need the most sophisticated and developed weapons. Syria possesses lots of such weapons.

The course of events and the historical background of all the Arab-Israeli wars indicate that most of these wars were wars of justification and not wars of liberation. In all the previous Arab-Israeli wars, not a single rocket reached the depth of Israel whereas the Palestinian fighter, with his modest resources, has been able to penetrate this barrier. Who guarantees that the Israeli security belt will continue to exist in the coming war? Will Israel be able to direct the blow to any spot in the Syrian territories? But what wasn't there before is the fact that Syria can now deal Israel the blow it wants and in any place it wants because sophisticated modern weapons are no longer an Israeli monopoly. This new qualitative development is declared to both the United States and Israel. Moreover, Syria can withstand any human loss, stand fast and not capitulate whereas Israel cannot withstand any human loss before it capitulates to the Palestinian and Arab right. Any future Israeli movement for confrontation with the basic link--Syria and the Palestinian resistance--will be subject to careful calculations.

The United States wagered in its endeavor to solve its dilemma on the ability of its agents to wrench consensus within the Arab family in order to realize its goals and implement its schemes. But the sudden failure of the Amman summit has forced the United States to search for a new solution. The value of this quick and historic failure lies in the fact that it has put the stick at the feet of the new ruler coming to the White House.

The U.S. rulers, along with their allies in Western Europe, led by Socialist International, hastened to support the [Amman] summit and to declare their recognition of Jordan as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The Amman summit exposed the identity of all of them, especially the Socialist International representatives, led by Kreisky.

The U.S. administration launched its political offensive with the start of the Gulf war to create a new local situation in order to deal with the new international situation whose picture began to crystallize in the air from the time Reagan won the U.S. elections. But it is my estimate that in its offensive, the U.S. did not rely on scientific calculations as much as it relied on the pressure exerted on it by its economic dilemma. The economic crisis is the motive and the basis. The problems

created by this crisis are unemployment, inflation and the inability to reach fundamental solutions. This crisis is also experienced by most of the third world countries that live under the canopy of the bourgeoisie because the world economic crisis is indivisible. The solution to the international economic crisis can only be reached within the framework of common cooperation among all the parties concerned. Realized within the international family (United Nations), such a solution can only be at the expense of the United States itself.

Control

The United States cannot overcome its dilemma. Overcoming this dilemma requires joint international efforts exerted cooperatively by all the parties involved to deal with the crisis of the world--capitalist--economy. This is what the United States rejects because it realizes that this only possible solution is at its expense. This is why it is proceeding with its policy to control Europe and the Middle East in order to solve its economic problems at the expense of the European and Middle Eastern people who experience the same crisis and who believe that the solution to their problem lies in economic and political liberation and in escaping the U.S. grip. But the United States disregards the realities of the age and this disregard is keeping it under this dilemma which harbors within its folds the beginnings of the collapse of world capitalism. As Britain turned previously into a second or third rate power, the United States will, if it fails to acknowledge the facts of the age and to change its economic and social structure, also turn into a second rate power much quicker than many imagine.

I may not be exaggerating if I say that the collapse, whose signs have begun to appear in the capitalist structure, is generated here in this part of the world by the struggle momentum building up on this Arab soil. This struggle has to be settled and it can only be settled in the disfavor of imperialism, its agents and its supporters.

I recall that in 1978 the French minister of foreign affairs broke a promise he had made to a PLO official that he would declare during his visit to the area his country's support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, justifying his failure to fulfill the promise by a request from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that he "refrain from making such a declaration in the Middle East."

Ultimately, the interests of a Europe independent in the French style may not be in conflict in the short run with supporting the Arab liberation movement and, to put it precisely, with supporting a national solution to the Palestinian problem if Europe's economic interests are protected, contrary to the United States.

Here and in the sphere of the U.S.-Soviet struggle, there is a constant struggle. It is the struggle of ideological conflict and the struggle to realize greater gains by each side. Each side has its plan. In addition to the ideological struggle, there are the economic interests also. Each of the two sides pays special --strategic-- attention to the Middle East. The Middle East and its wealth are the prime center of the U.S. attention in its efforts to overcome its dilemma. The Soviet Union knows this. In addition to having its precautionary plans--considering the geographic connection that links it to the Middle East and considering the Middle East's military importance--the Soviet Union will not enable the United States to

solve its problems by allowing it to control the Middle East. Here, the Soviet interests meet with the Arab liberation movement. This situation creates an ideological responsibility dictated by the rules of the struggle at a time when the Soviet Union knows that it is superior and that the superior have international rights that must be acknowledged.

Rights of Superior

This is why in 1962 the Soviet Union withdrew its missile from Cuba after it had deployed them there. This was done in acknowledgement of the rights of the superior because Washington was superior at the time. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been based on the same rule, but on a different scale.

In my opinion, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has not been for protecting the progressive regime there. But with its volume and its quality, this serious decision by the Soviet leaders has drawn the attention of all. What has drawn the attention of the observers is the acknowledgement with which this intervention has been received by the United States that has been content with denunciation. There is no difference here between the position of the United States and that of any minor power. It is the decision of the superior and its goal goes beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Its goal is a direct and effective presence for solving the Middle East crisis.

It is worth noting here an article by Leonid Zamyatin, described in the western capitals as the official spokesman of Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and of the Soviet diplomacy, published in the west. The article was published by NEWSWEEK and says in part: we wonder how the United States and the countries supporting it would act if the Soviet Union drew up a five-year or ten-year military program to make the Soviets the superior military power in the world? Concluding his article, Zamyatin says: "Carter's screams regarding Afghanistan are very much like those of a foolish woman. He screams and the others pay him no attention." These are the words of the superior. What does Zamyatin mean by the others? He means the Third World and those who have national interests in this Third World and who differentiate between the prestige of the United States and the interests of their peoples.

The ceaseless struggle between the national liberation forces and the imperialist and Zionist forces in the Middle East has been in the interest of the liberation movement in the past 5 years. (But now), imperialism is devoting its attention to its supporters in the heart of the Middle East area.

In a desperate struggle, the national liberation movement has realized major victories for the persecuted peoples in the areas bordering the Middle East, with the support of the Soviet Union and of the socialist bloc. The Red Sea and its strategic depth, Ethiopia, are a part of the world liberation movement. The Democratic Yemen, the Arab Gulf and its depth, Iran, are also on the borders of the Middle East. They have all become a part of the anti-imperialist world liberation movement.

In the heart of the Middle East, the relationship [sic] is being developed with the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and is being entrenched with Syria which constitutes a depth for the Arabs in the Arab East and an arena for confronting the Zionist enemy. All these are victories for the world liberation movement against the imperialist policy. Any regime liberated from the grip of the United States,

regardless of such a regime's political and social system, is an effective factor in the anti-imperialist world liberation movement. An example of this is the Islamic regime in Iran, despite its ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, which is moving ahead with the support and backing of the Soviet Union because there are common interests between the two sides, namely hostility toward imperialism and support for the persecuted.

Amman and Dilemma

There are numerous forces in this world waiting for the [outcome of] the struggle in this area. These forces will deal with the outcome, regardless of their political identity, in order to preserve their interests, including the nonaligned countries and others.

The struggle between the imperialist forces and the forces of the world liberation movement in the Middle East will end up in favor of the world liberation movement forces in the area--should the imperialist and liberation forces resort to military confrontation--because the balance of powers is in favor of the world liberation movement's parties in the area and not in favor of the pro-U.S. Arabs. It is my belief that it will be impossible for the struggle between the imperialist forces and world liberation forces in the area to extend to the direct military forces of both sides because this would invite a world war. Such a war is guaranteed not to erupt because the balance of forces is tipped in favor of the world liberation movement. The fatal dilemma of the U.S. people has started. The first and important round which took place in the Amman conference failed because the objective facts were disregarded and not employed in the struggle. Though all the pro-U.S. Arabs may not have been aware of these facts, the White House politicians were aware of them. While the conferees in the heart of the Middle East were expressing their opinions without reservation on the goals of the conference, hinting every now and then that they would cut off their financial aid to the forces rejecting their plan, direct threats were made against certain parties in the Middle East, hinting that force would be used to topple entire reactionary regimes. There was also the Iranian position, the fear of intransigence on the part of the Iranian revolution and the expected possibilities of the Iranian revolution's steadfastness and of its scoring a victory. Moreover, there was the Ethiopian threat to Sudan which motivated the Sudanese president to go to Addis Ababa and to agree to the Ethiopian terms.

All these struggles and their consequences took place in the week of the offensive during which the Amman summit was held. Here, the mind immediately recalls the wise words of Christ: "Not by bread alone does man live." The violent struggle has begun and the next 4 years, covering Reagan's term, will continue to witness such violence. This violence has been approved by the White House politicians and its approval has not, to my belief, been based on careful calculations but rather on emotions generated by the illusion of victory. These are the calculations of the current emotional buildup and of the fear of the future which has led to despair. [Torn] between the feeling of despair or of confronting the reality, the White House politicians have opted for rash radicalism, for war and for the use of force and violence. Despair resulting from calculations showing the inability to confront the international and local problems requires the courage to retreat and make concessions or else leads to radicalism and adventurism.

Reagan, the hero of the U.S. despair, has initiated his policy by threatening to confront the Soviets with force, i.e. abolition of SALT II, to solve the Middle East problem quickly, to reach agreement with Europe quickly, consequently striking the spirit of independence in some European countries, and to take a position against the nonalignment movement in order to control the rebellious Third World. The aim of all of this is to secure the required condition. This condition is complete [U.S.] political and military control. All this is aimed at preserving the U.S. prestige and at saving the United States that it may continue to be the strongest world power. Behind all of this there is the fear that the United States will become a second rate power.

Decisive Years

Reagan knows that his control over the Middle East is the inlet to improving his situation vis-a-vis Europe and the Soviet Union and for confronting the rebellious Third World. His control over the Middle East and its resources will guarantee him the ability to exert economic pressure on all the international forces. Military deployment [in the Middle East], if possible, is the only thing that will enable him to use force any he wants by virtue of the Middle East's strategic position which overlaps geographically with all [sic] the continents and which is close to the Soviet territories. Such a dream is in contradiction with the march of history.

Yes, the next 4 years are important in the life of mankind. In the next 4 years, matters may become more complicated as the result of victories that may be scored by the radicals in the White House. Such victories mean dealing a blow constituting the start of the collapse of the world liberation movement. Instead of the positive defense which must inevitably lead the parties of the world liberation movement to the point of attack in order to defend their current positions, there will be the positive defense of Moscow because the U.S. offensive will develop in the coming years to create more division in the progressive movement.

This imperialist visualization is not at all realistic. The next 4 years will inevitably witness international consensus over the new realities in this world--realities embodied in social and political changes. Objectively, the consensus is there. But this objective reality still requires a decision from the White House leaders so that it may become a criterion for solving all the pending international issues.

The next 4 years will not witness realization of the U.S. dream but will rather witness the U.S. acknowledgement of the reality. This acknowledgement will constitute the historic turning point in the human movement, bolstering and enhancing it within firm spheres and with a clear vision with the aim of solving the pending international issues, of which the most important are the international economic problem and the Middle East problem.

Reagan may neither complete nor finish because he will further complicate the U.S. dilemma, and this complexity will be felt before 1984. To obviate this situation and to preserve their interests, it will then be the inevitable duty of the White House politicians to either advocate the futility of this policy and prepare for the presidency of the 4 following years or try to get rid of Reagan, as they did with Nixon, one of his predecessors. The United States will reach such a conclusion and by reaching it, the international consensus over dealing with the new realities will

attain actual international relaxation in solving the pending problems. The reality stating that "we are on the threshold of the phase of the collapse of imperialism" will be thus crystallized. The struggle will not stop because the United States is still strong, and so are the imperialist forces.

Belief in Changes

The future developments will lead us to the historic turning point which carries within its folds changes in the interest of the world liberation movement. Changes in the U.S. policy are justifiable because the goal is to preserve the U.S. interests. Moreover, there are those who believe in change in the United States.

The United States itself was the party which ratified the SALT II treaty and the party which approved the 1977 Soviet-U.S. declaration for solving the Middle East problem--a declaration which we thought constituted a relative change in the interest of the Palestinian people, considering that it used the word "rights" instead of "interests." It was also the United States itself which backed down on the U.S.-Soviet declaration in 1977 and which has rejected SALT II.

All the observers were watching when Brezhnev and Carter met in Vienna. [They wondered]: Will the SALT negotiations be linked to the Middle East issue or not? The communique on the meeting was issued, saying that agreement was reached on the SALT II issue and that there was no agreement on the Middle East issue. Nobody knows the facts of the agreement on which the United States backed down [sic]. But there was no agreement on the Middle East problem. This is what the Soviet Union declared. The United States insists on controlling the Middle East and it has aspired and continues to aspire to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, through bargaining, to establish exclusive U.S. control in the Middle East as a price for ratifying SALT II. It is true that agreement on SALT II would constitute the proof that the pending international problems are solved. But with its geographic and economic position, the Middle East is the effective asset for both forces: The world liberation movement and world imperialism--an asset that preserves and enhances the political, social and military accomplishments of each side.

Axiom of Failure

Here, one recalls the answer that Brezhnev gave Reagan's envoy to the Soviet Union last month, an answer to the effect that the Soviet Union will not help the United States solve its economic crisis. So, the conflict is obvious and the intricacies are clear and well known to both sides. The triumph of one side over the other does not rely on the military strength of either side but on its total alliances, influence and interests. The Third World interests are lurking to inflict defeat on imperialism. Moreover, the interests of the Europeans who advocate the preservation of their political and, consequently, economic independence require avoiding identification with the U.S. radicalism. These interests, which are needed for the survival of these peoples, find themselves overlapping by varying degrees with the world socialist movement. Some of these [European] interests reach the degree of being identical with the political, economic and social interests of the Third World peoples.

We can go as far as saying that the failure of Reagan's policy is axiomatic. What stands behind the doors closed in the face of this policy are the interests of the

peoples and not the will of reactionary rulers. Standing behind those doors is the change that has developed in the balance of forces in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America where there are armed peoples and not mercenary armies. Also standing behind these doors is the mighty and superior, by Reagan's own admission, military power of the world socialist movement. There also stands behind these doors the international economic dilemma which is being examined by the majority of the world thinkers, most of whom are from the so-called "free world." This problem has to be solved by realizing a detente on whose basis somewhat common plans are formulated to deal with inflation and unemployment. The failure facing Reagan is also embodied in the disagreement within the capitalist camp itself because the economic interests of the parties to this camp vary and this difference is confirmed by the figures showing high unemployment in the "free world." This fact encourages further capitalist discord, rather than accord, in this camp.

[20 Dec 80, p 11]

[Text] The fact that control of the Middle East is the basis for the United States to overcome its dilemma urges us, we in the Arab liberation movement, by necessity to define our positions toward this fact.

What is the interest of the Arab peoples and what, consequently, is our role as Palestinians first?

We, as an Arab liberation movement led by the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, must first differentiate between steadfastness to defeat the U.S. scheme by preventing it from realizing its goals in the Middle East and steadfastness to build and develop our intrinsic strength in order to impose the Arab nation's terms and rights. There is a difference between steadfastness and the victory for which we aspire. Al-Sadat's visit was the historical turning point in treason against the Arab nation's and Palestine's interests. This visit has been confronted with effective steadfastness on the Arab arena. This steadfastness has been confined to two frameworks: The summit conferences and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

The Arab arena has witnessed numerous maneuvers in which the Arab consensus has been a consensus of conflicts. In the summit conferences, each of the conflicting forces has its declared and its undeclared plans. Whereas the forces of steadfastness and confrontation seek ceaselessly to preserve the Arab consensus against Israel and, consequently, against Camp David and al-Sadat, the reactionary forces seek on their part to strike first the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front framework and then to strike this front's forces separately, either by dragging the front to the reactionary scheme, namely approval of Camp David, or by toppling the front's regimes. For the sake of the truth, I say that the reactionary forces, and not the steadfastness and confrontation forces, are the ones that have developed their plan for effective confrontation.

Whereas the summit conferences have been approving statements identical with the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's demands, the reactionary forces have been exerting utmost efforts to carry out sabotage action against Syria and the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon. The bloody incidents witnessed by Syria and the financial and political pressures experienced by the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement in Lebanon are the result of the action and planning of the

reactionary forces because destroying the central link in the Zionist-Arab conflict and destroying the liberation movement of all the Arab masses depends fundamentally on [destroying] Syria and the Palestinian revolution by virtue of their interests and of their geographic position. Throughout the past 30 years, the reactionaries have gotten us accustomed to staying in a state of defense. They have been the force ceaselessly seeking coexistence under the slogan of "all the Arabs to Palestine." Reaction and its intellectuals are the parties that have been claiming that the social liberation projected by the Arab liberation movement can be realized in this phase only at the expense of liberating Palestine. Many of the parties of the Arab liberation movement have fallen into this trap, thus giving precedence to developing military strength in isolation from the issue of squaring the social and political conditions in their countries.

Thus, reaction has responded to, and I am not saying decided, the U.S. position. In its response, reaction has exerted all its strength, relying on the state of vacillation under which the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front lived. In the 1979 Tunis summit which preceded the recent Amman summit, reaction tried to send some feelers, expressed its views behind the scenes in preparation for the summit and projected the idea of the required Arab initiative. But a word made behind the scenes by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad reached the ears of the reactionary forces. Al-Asad said: "We are going to Tunis. Either the position against Israel, Camp David and al-Sadat continues or we will come back here and let reaction defend its countries."

Query in Riyadh

Riyadh inquired about the Syrian president's statement before its representative reached Tunis. When they became certain in Riyadh that President al-Asad did make the statement, the Saudi representative rushed to meet with him as soon as he arrived in Tunis and before convocation of the summit. He hastened to ask the president, and to answer the question before the president could say anything: "Who said that we want to bypass the Baghdad and Rabat summits? We cling to them [meaning to their resolutions]." In the first few minutes of that [opening] session, the Tunis summit ended, considering that its political position had already been decided.

Reaction responded out of fear. But will fear continue to be the reaction to the steadfastness and confrontation forces or is it inevitable that the reactionaries' fear will turn into a declared policy required by the Arab area's conditions and by the Arab peoples' interests, especially the interests of the Palestinian cause? The reactionaries; fear and retreat is always dictated by their calculations. The reactionaries are in constant fear of the decline of their influence and they are always afraid of an effective confrontation between them and the Arab liberation forces because an effective confrontation between the reactionary forces and the Arab liberation forces will drop, with action, all the deceitful slogans raised by the reactionaries. The silence of the steadfastness and confrontation forces over certain facts in the Arab summits gives the reactionaries influence over the masses, leads to continued coexistence between the reactionaries and the liberation forces under the slogan of solidarity, we continue to be spectators who can do no more than censure in whispers the sabotaging activities of the reactionaries and the situation turns in favor of imperialism.

Coexistence thus becomes a margin for the reactionaries through which they seek to assume the actual leadership of the Arab area, as we have felt recently. This is why the reactionaries made their decision in the Amman summit and wanted to reap the fruits of their decision and of their actions throughout the 2 years preceding that summit. So they confronted the steadfastness forces which have stood fast effectively and courageously. This steadfastness was evident in the hot confrontation at the time of the Amman summit convocation.

Here, we ask: Was the refrainment from participating in the Amman summit the result of a political decision taking into account the consequences of the confrontation? If it was so, then that refrainment has its major historical value. Or was the refrainment dictated by the buildup of direct conflicts and by the fear of the confrontation and of its consequences?

The result achieved by the Arab steadfastness forces is important and has had its direct impact.

The dilemma is now the dilemma of the United States and of its local forces in the area. The dilemma requires a major effort and the United States will not overcome it except by resorting to military force, and in this regard it is the weaker. The margin of an Arab solidarity to implement the U.S. scheme through a new Arab plan, now that the Amman summit scheme has been buried, is a narrow margin. In the near and distant future, the reactionaries will seek coexistence with the aim of changing the positions of the steadfastness and confrontation forces. In the Amman summit, the issue of the Arab area's leadership was settled whereas it had been in the preceding 3 years subject to the question of whether it was in the hands of the rich Arabs, represented by Saudi Arabia and its allies, or in the hands of the political leadership of the steadfastness and confrontation forces, represented by Syria and the PLO.

For Whom Is Leadership?

The Amman summit and its results have settled this issue. The Syrian and Palestinian leadership is the leadership of the correct approach defending the interests of the masses and of the poor. The leadership is in the hands of those who stand in the face of the U.S. policy and of Israel and does not belong to those who want to defend their private interests in disregard to the interests of the masses and want to defend the interests of rich people with immeasurable wealth while the Arab area is approaching a stifling economic crisis.

Therefore, preserving the distinctive character of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in the confrontation, this front's abidance by its program and its confronting any endeavor to change the current balance of forces on the Arab arena, especially in Syria and Lebanon--this alone is capable of inflicting a crushing defeat on the U.S. plan coming with Reagan.

But isn't it time for us to think of what is beyond steadfastness, of victory? We have already said that there is a difference between the conditions of victory and the conditions of steadfastness. The conditions of steadfastness are present with the current resources. But the conditions of victory require new elements and these new elements have become essential for the Arab liberation forces because

the current elements and the required new elements constitute the intrinsic weight of the Arab liberation movement in its totality and of its ability to translate the national reality of the most delicate current phase through which the international struggle is passing.

The world, the entire world, deals with realities. Therefore, we must couple our declared national political demands with intrinsic action capable of realizing them and capable of protecting that which is not in conflict with our national Arab interests and with what is required by the interests of the area's peoples.

Therefore, the current national and pan-Arab interest requires an offensive confrontation against the U.S. policy, and this time on the basis of the Arab reality. Such a matter (confrontation) should not be subject to any calculations because the historical national responsibility dictates it. The policy of confrontation recently approved by the United States also demands it. So that we may not be lost while arranging the ladder of the priorities of the responsibilities thrown on the shoulders of the Arab liberation movement, we must adopt the criterion of the United States itself and we must focus on the most central issue. The struggle in our area, and we are using here the U.S. criterion, is focused on the area of direct contact in the arena of struggle against Zionism and Israel. As the United States and the reactionaries have focused on the PLO and Syria by virtue of the fact that they are parties with direct interests and by virtue of their geographic location which is adjacent to Palestine's borders, we must also exert efforts to strengthen the position of Syria and of the resistance. This has actually happened. But the requirements of victory demand that we exert efforts, and with utter frankness, to expand the geographic area of this presence (of Syria and PLO) on the Arab arena and around the areas of contact (with Israel) in order to realize the intrinsic ability which is capable not only of standing fast but also of realizing victory.

U.S. Solution

In addition to serious efforts to fulfill the Camp David accord and to topple al-Sadat's regime in order to restore Egypt to the Arab national line, we must also take into consideration an important fact in our Arab East, namely the Jordanian regime and its role. By virtue of the U.S. criterion regarding the need to topple the Syrian regime and the Palestinian resistance as a direct force on the struggle arena, the Jordanian regime uses fundamental and direct instruments in the actual struggle arena. The conditions of the coming U.S. scheme require toppling the Syrian regime and the Palestinian revolution in reliance on Amman's direct role. Why shouldn't our conditions for the next 4 years also include a confrontation with Amman's regime? This confrontation will not be in self-defense but for the purpose of change intended to enhance the ability of the Arab nation in the face of the imperialist and Zionist enemy because the course of the Arab struggle requires this change for the realization of victory. It is needless to define the Jordanian regime's role in the U.S. scheme. This role is direct and is being currently performed by this regime. With its hostility and its attempts to engage in sabotage against Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian right, Jordan's position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict is tantamount to realizing a direct mission in the service of the United States.

To learn the interest of the Jordanian regime, we must study the U.S. solution for the Middle East problem and compare this solution with the Arab national solution, called when approved by the Arab summits "the phased Arab solution for the Middle East problem."

The U.S. solution is based on three basic mainstays:

1. Obliterating the Palestinian right on Palestine's soil and striking the armed Palestinian presence outside Palestine.
2. Striking the Arab liberation movement and breaking its alliance with the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union.
3. Setting up an Arab-Israeli-U.S. alliance in the face of "world communism."

National Solution

The national solution has been approved by the summit conferences as a political decision. But we in the Arab liberation movement have not defined the mainstays on which this solution must be based in order to be realized in this phase. As the U.S. solution has its three mainstays, the Arab solution also has its three mainstays:

1. It requires a strong, and very strong, Palestinian revolution as a fundamental condition for attaining the Palestinian right to independence and repatriation.
2. It requires the Arab liberation movement to have a strong, capable, politically clear and deep-rooted force.
3. It requires special relations with the Soviet Union which bolster the capabilities of the Arab liberation movement in cases of both defense and offense on the basis of the common interests between the Arab liberation movement and the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

Here, we become aware of the direct interests of the direct roles of both Syria and the Palestinian revolution on one side and of Jordan on the other. These interests are conflicting interests. The Jordanian regime believes that the creation of a Palestinian state may topple the Hashimite throne, that the continued struggle against Israel gives the progressive forces a broader sphere [of influence], that the demands of the Arab-Israeli conflict require developing the relationship with the Soviet Union and entrenching it economically and politically and that the continuation of this conflict drops the slogan of neutrality between the Soviet Union and the United States and bolsters the slogan of "we are with those who support our interests." Such an option, [Jordan believes], will necessarily lead us to an alliance with the Soviets against imperialism. The leadership of the struggle against the Zionist enemy, against Israel and on the frontline is in the hands of Syria and the Palestinian revolution.

Jordan and Hashimites

Jordan has "legitimate" fears because the outcome of the phased national solution will be realized at the expense of the Zionist ambition and the expense of the existence of the Hashimite throne, and not of Jordan. The historical task of this Hashimite throne has been that of imprisoning the Palestinian people and this task may come to an end when the national solution is realized. If the strategic calculations find it impossible that the Hashimite regime will survive if an independent Palestinian state is set up and if such a result was a must when Egypt was actually

present and in the service of the Arab national peace, then such a must has become with the absence of Egypt the way to establish the Palestinian state and to restore the phased national solution to the path of overthrowing the Hashimite regime and of preserving an independent Jordanian state. The relationship between an independent Palestinian state and an independent Jordanian state will be inseparable. The unity of these two states will be imposed by the overlapping interests of the two peoples and such a unity will constitute the model for the Arab unity. Moreover, the interest of the Jordanian people in an independent Palestinian state is the same as the interest of the Palestinian people. The interest of both peoples is embodied in setting up a Palestinian state over the soil of Palestine. The creation of such a state means putting an end to the Zionist ambition which seeks, on the basis of the U.S. solution, to control Damascus and Baghdad after controlling Amman. We must also make a distinction between the Jordanian throne's interest and the Jordanian people's interest.

The goal is to set up an independent Palestinian state. We want this independence on our national soil. The value of this independence lies in curtailing the Zionist ambition as a phased solution. This is why we view the U.S. solution as a means of bolstering the monarchic regime in Jordan and the Israeli regime in Palestine, as well as a means of bolstering the future Israeli role on the Arab arena at the expense of the Palestinians. This role has, from the U.S. viewpoint, extended recently at the expense of the Lebanese people. The situation is as follows: Efforts are being exerted to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon. This will consequently push Lebanon toward division and fragmentation into several entities. Therefore, the U.S. settlement is at the expense of both the Palestinian and Lebanese people. We are not advocating here the overthrow of the Hashimite regime out of the love of change. But realistically: Is the Hashimite regime capable of opting with the Arab national forces or with the United States and its interests? We do not think that the Jordanian regime is capable of choosing. This is why the conflict between our aspiration, as Palestinian people, to establish the independent Palestinian state and the existence of this regime will continue until the regime proves the opposite by advancing political, military and all kinds of aid to the Palestinian revolution, until it opens its borders for the Palestinian resistance to carry out action against the Israeli forces and until it makes it easy for the PLO to operate amidst the Palestinian people in Jordan.

Expanding Sphere of Alliance

The future struggle in the Middle East requires us to expand the sphere of alliance with our neighbors--an alliance which may reach the point of (identical goals)--for the sake of the confrontation in the Middle East. Here emerges the importance of establishing a serious relationship among the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front parties, the Iranian revolution and the African national and progressive movement. Here also emerges the importance of responding to the Iranian slogan raised recently in Damascus by (Hojatoleslam) Hashemi Rafsanjani regarding the need to achieve military unity between Iran, Syria, Iraq and Palestine to confront Israel. This slogan has become a must and such a unity will bolster Iran as it will bolster the Arab liberation movement.

Unity of the Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian-Palestinian forces is a goal for which utmost efforts must be exerted in the coming phase. The Palestinian position has a particular characteristic which the non-Palestinian may not feel. In addition to our national and pan-Arab position in defense of the interests of all the Arab peoples,

there is the special Palestinian characteristic, namely the past years of suffering under which our Palestinian people have lived. They are the years of homelessness and of the memories of the whips of the henchmen rulers in the Arab area. The fear that homelessness will become a reality makes us say loudly: We will fight and will confront.

We have said a little about what is taking place around us in our Arab area. The ghost of what is taking place will not scare us because our need for one graveyard one school and one special and independent national identity motivates us to be courageous and to pull away all the masks of political courtesy and falsehood facing us on the Arab arena. Moreover, I say that the responsibility to protect the Arab territories, to preserve the Arab interests against Israel and to liberate Jerusalem is the responsibility of all the Arab, Islamic progressive and free peoples.

The responsibility falls on the shoulders of all parties of the Arab liberation movement: Syria, Algeria, the Democratic Yemen, Libya and the PLO. The prime responsibility falls on the shoulders of Syria by virtue of its location and role, on the shoulders of the Palestinian revolution by virtue of its being the crux of the conflict and on the shoulders of Iran by virtue of its position and aspiration.

Realization of the phased national solution approved by the Arab summits requires the Arabs to wage a victorious war against Israel and its allies. The assets of this war are the Arab masses with all their resources. So why shouldn't 1981 be the year for solving the Middle East problem, as Reagan has designated it. Why shouldn't it be the year of Iran's accession to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, with all the Iranian military, political and popular weight, and why shouldn't this accession be our path to steadfastness and victory?

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C50: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FDP'S MOELLEMANN MEETS WITH 'ARAFAT, URGES PLO RECOGNITION

LD132000 Hamburg DPA in German 1840 GMT 13 Mar 81

[Text] Beirut, 13 Mar (DPA)--FDP Lower House Deputy Juergen Moellemann, in a talk with German journalists in Beirut on Friday evening, has advocated that "relations between the Federal Republic and the PLO be put on an official basis." However, official recognition of the PLO is not possible since this is possible only between the Federal Republic and sovereign states.

Earlier Moellemann had had a 2 and 1/2 hour talk with PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat, among other things on the mediation efforts in the Iraq-Iran war, the Middle East conflict and relations between the Federal Republic and the PLO. Moellemann said he explained to 'Arafat that mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO would make talks on solving the Middle East conflict easier.

'Arafat, who is directly involved in the mediating efforts between Iran and Iraq within the framework of the Islamic Committee of Nine, told Moellemann that the mediators in Tehran faced one particular problem: It is difficult in Tehran to find competent and authorized negotiating partners for armistice talks.

On 26 April, 'Arafat told Moellemann, the Islamic mediating committee is to meet again in Jidda (Saudi Arabia) in a renewed attempt at bringing about a truce.

Moellemann told German journalists that in his talks in Saudi Arabia the wish for German arms supplies once again had been expressed. "There will be great disappointment in Saudi Arabia if such arms supplies are refused by the Federal Republic," Moellemann added. Both the Kuwaiti Government as well as 'Arafat in talks with him welcomed the efforts by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to contribute towards solving the Middle East conflict.

CSO: 4403

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL SPEAKER ADDRESSES ALGIERS CONFERENCE

LD161139 Algiers ASH-SHA'B in Arabic 10 Mar 81 p 3

[Unattributed report on speech delivered by Palestine National Council speaker Khalid al-Fahum at the second Arab Parliamentary Conference in Algiers on 9 March]

[Text] When brother Rabi'h Bitat, speaker of the National People's Assembly and current chairman of the second Arab Parliamentary Conference, ended his speech, Khalid al-Fahum, speaker of the Palestine National Council and chairman of the Arab Parliamentary Union, delivered a speech. He began by referring to the historical battle the Algerian revolution waged against colonialism and to its present gigantic efforts to increase its intrinsic power and contribute effectively to the solution of contemporary world issues, including the issues of the Third World.

After referring to the conference agenda and the positive results achieved at the ninth session of the Arab Parliamentary Union, Khalid al-Fahum spoke about the difficult circumstances the Arab nation is experiencing as a result of the Zionist and imperialist maneuvers aimed at affecting the Palestinian issue, beginning with the Camp David conspiracies, as-Sadat's capitulationist endeavors designed to hit the Palestinian people's struggle, and the repeated raids by the Zionist enemy on South Lebanon and ending with the Zionist occupation authorities' efforts to impose so-called autonomy on the occupied Arab territories.

The speaker of the Palestine National Council expressed in this connection the determination of the Palestinian people in particular and the Arab people in general to regain their rights and liberate their usurped territories under the banner of international justice and legitimacy.

Al-Fahum emphasized in his speech the Palestinian people's adherence to their right like all other peoples, to determine their own fate, to establish their own independent state and to return to their usurped property and land.

He said in this respect that complete withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories is a basic condition for any form of just peace in the area.

He then referred to the fact that the European Parliament is linking the Arab-European dialogue with participation by the as-Sadat regime. He pointed out that inasmuch as this attitude is not based on misunderstanding, it is a disavowal of friendship and flagrant interference, shows contempt for the Arab people and the Arab Parliamentarians and undermines the principle and aims of Arab-European parliamentary dialogue.

Regarding this escalating conspiracy, the Palestine National Council speaker emphasized the inevitability of establishing effective Arab solidarity based on commitment to the Arab nation's aims of liberating the land, expelling the aggressor and developing the Arab natural resources for the sake of the Arab people's progress and prosperity.

In the course of his speech, al-Fahum proposed that this conference set up a committee of parliament speakers to tour the Arab countries to clarify any ambiguities and explain the seriousness of the present conspiracy.

Al-Fahum concluded his speech by emphasizing the Palestinian revolution's determination to unite with the Lebanese people and their nationalist forces in confronting the Zionist aggression. Because the aim of the Palestinian revolution is to liberate Palestine, it cooperates with and does not work against legitimate government either in Lebanon or elsewhere.

CSO: 4802

GULF INDEPENDENCE EMPHASIZED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 9 Mar 81 p 3

[Text]

JEDDAH, March 8 (SPA) — The Gulf region and its people must be kept away from international rivalries and alliances in order to remain a zone of peace and stability, Information Minister Dr. Muhammad Abdo Yamani said Sunday.

"We reject anybody's mandate and do not believe in pacts and alliances," he added. Yamani said the Western powers must realize that the leaders and the people of the region mean what they say and that they will not permit the stationing of any foreign troops in this area and will refuse any foreign military bases here.

"Although we have good and friendly relations with many countries, it does not mean that we shall welcome foreign troops and interference in our internal affairs," he added.

He did not pay much attention to the statements made recently by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who was quoted as saying Britain is willing to participate in a "fire brigade" operation in the Gulf with the United States by supplying naval ships for patrol purposes.

Yamani said the meeting of Gulf foreign ministers which is to open in Muscat, Oman, Monday indicated the sense of responsibility of the states involved and their willingness

and readiness to continue strengthening their bonds of coordination and cooperation. "This will enable us to talk with one voice and use one language," he said.

The meeting was arranged by the leaders of the six gulf states which include the Kingdom, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. A council for cooperation was formed to coordinate internal external policies.

A conference of deputy information ministers and other media experts from the six states has been meeting in Muscat to prepare the ground for a meeting of information ministers due to be held there Tuesday and Wednesday.

Oman's Information Minister Abdul Aziz Al Rawas described the cooperation council as the basic vehicle for cooperation in all walks of life — including keeping the region away from foreign intervention and international rivalries.

Meanwhile it was announced that the board of the Arab Gulf chambers of commerce will meet in Dammam Wednesday to discuss its role in light of the cooperation council, the standardization of postal, telegraphic and civil aviation services in the region, the formation of an arbitration committee and other matters.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PLO REPRESENTATIVE, SOVIET AMBASSADOR MEET--PLO representative Hakam Bal'awn met with the Soviet ambassador today. The latest developments in the region were discussed, particularly the developments pertaining to the Palestinian issue in light of the Zionist military concentrations and escalations against southern Lebanon. This meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Tunis comes within the framework of the relations of friendship and cooperation linking the PLO and the Soviet Union. [Text] JN161829 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic to the Arab world 1745 GMT 16 Mar 81]

SECURITY COOPERATION DISCUSSED--Today the minister of the interior, Al Bu-sa'id Badr Ibn Su'ud Ibn Harib met Brig Shaykh Hamad Ibn Jasim Al Thani, the police commander of Qatar, who is now in the country. Shaykh Hamad Ibn Jasim Al Thani made a statement on arrival in which he said that he would be holding talks with Shaykh Abdullah Bin Ali [word indistinct], the under secretary at the Interior Ministry, the police officials on matters related to the strengthening of bilateral relations, especially in the field of police and security, in the interests of the two countries and the Gulf region. LD151851 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 15 Mar 81]

CSO: 4802

SOVIET TERROR CLAIMS MORE CIVILIAN VICTIMS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Mar 81 pp 151-160

[Article by Erich Wiedemann: "Fighting With Our Fathers' Weapons"]

[Text] "This is Afsal, our little prince," the nurse says. "He comes from one of the first families of Pushtunistan." She bends down to speak to her patient and exchanges a few words of Pushtu with him.

The little prince is distraught; he looks past her and lifts his arms up from under the covers. The visitor wants to reach for the little boy's hand. But the nurse restrains him and makes the boy put his arms back under the covers.

One of his sleeves is half empty. "A Russian booby trap," the nurse says. A mine had ripped off both of the boy's hands, one of them up to the elbow. The war does not spare the children either.

Booby traps are among the most insidious weapons the Soviet occupation forces use to break the Afghans' will to resist. They are tiny time bombs made to look like matchboxes, ballpoint pens or wrist watches that are dropped over roads and villages in great number by low-flying airplanes. The bombs do not explode on impact but only when they are picked up.

The most wicked example is the "green parrot," a colored plastic bird no larger than a child's fist, with funny claws and movable wings. The bomb goes off as soon as the wings are moved. The Russians have aptly named the "green parrot" a "bird for children."

"These booby traps are aimed against the civilian population above all," says professor Jamil Ahmed, a surgeon at Lady Reading Hospital in Peshawar. "They cannot get the Mujahidin any other way; so they try to destroy their base by subjecting the population to such acts of terror."

On the average, professor Jamil has to operate on three or four booby trap victims per week. "Only every fourth person wounded actually manages to escape," he says. "In Afghanistan itself, they cannot get treated."

The refugee camps along the border are full of horror stories about Russian atrocities. The "reds," it is said, throw handcuffed prisoners in the path of their tanks or blow poison gas into their pens in places like Shakar Darra or "Sugar Valley." In the Kunar valley east of Kabul, they are said to have sprayed the fields with acid to make them barren, to have filled in irrigation ditches and to have machinegunned herds of sheep. It will take 20 years, so people say, before the Kunar valley is fit for human habitation again. But there are no eyewitnesses available to confirm these acts.

In their conduct of war, the Mujahidin do not follow the Geneva or Hague Conventions either-- and there are witnesses to confirm it. In Masar-i-Sharif, for example, the Islamic insurgents strung up three Russian soldiers on lampposts and left them hanging for 3 days. In the Kunar valley, they put out the eyes of a group of Soviet stragglers and then pushed the soldiers off a cliff.

Nili Rahim Punjsheri, a nurse who worked at the Kabul military academy hospital for a year, has seen and treated many victims of Mujahidin terrorism. Many of the corpses had been mutilated by hatchet blows or bore stab wounds, she said after escaping to New Delhi.

She saw Afghan and Russian soldiers who had limbs cut off, their eyes put out, their torsos flayed. Some of the 35 Soviet soldiers taken prisoner in the fighting over the Punjsher valley and later murdered still had links of chains showing which had been drawn through their noses while still alive.

The burning hatred of the "greens" for the reds (green signifying the flag of the prophet) appears to be more intense than the patriotic fervor any invaders of Afghanistan had to contend with in previous centuries. The Russians are not looked upon simply as occupiers but as foreign infidel devils "who do not even have a book, in contrast to Christians and Moslems," as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the guerilla organization Hizb-e-Islami, says.

In the interest of more humane treatment, the Swiss Red Cross delegate Jean Courvoisier proposed last January that prison camps be set up in Islamabad so that prisoners would be locked up and not simply murdered.

But the Pakistanis turned him down. They already had refugee camps and wanted no part of POW camps. And the Mujahidin continue to say that for them the only good Russian is a dead Russian. "Misha and the Chucha-i-russ have robbed us of our country and our honor," Nadjibullah Puig, the Hizb-e-Islami leader at the Miramshar camp, says. "We want to kill them and nothing else."

The refugees in their tattered clothes that hardly protect them against the icy winter wind nod their head in agreement. No mercy should be shown for the "chucha-i-russ," the Afghans who do the Russians' bidding or for "Misha," which is their word for Ivan. After all, the Russians do not take prisoners, either.

Nadjibullah should know. He is the most renowned Russian killer in Miramshar. Of course, the notches in the stock of his Thomson automatic rifle mean just as little as the Hizb-e-Islami news releases listing the battles won which Western newsmen find in their pigeon-holes at the hotel desk.

But Nadjibullah can at least prove that he has had contact with the enemy-- which is more than most of the liberation movement functionaries in Peshawar can say for themselves.

"I captured all this myself," he says with pride as he takes his trophies out of a rucksack which, to judge by the name tag sewn on it, once belonged to one Wolfgang Peguleit of Herne, FRG and spreads the items out in the sand in front of his tent. There is a Soviet identity card with a hole in the middle so that only the names Pjotr Danilovich are legible; a family photograph in a plastic frame with an inscription; a toy bear made in Moscow about the size of a "green parrot" but not containing an explosive charge.

Nadjibullah has no doubts about who is going to win in the end. "They have stronger weapons, but we have stouter hearts," he says. "When they hear the voice of our rifles, they throw theirs down and run."

Saying this, he rips the Thomson off his shoulder and fires a burst at a flock of black goats passing by. The bystanders go wild, crying: "Margbar, russ; margbar russ! - Death to the Russians, death to the Russians!"

Whereupon a group of p.r. girls make their entrance, intoning the Mujahidin song: "Mummand, my bridegroom, if you should die fighting, I will wrap your body in my most beautiful veil." One of the West German airmen who flew in tents and blankets for the refugees says that the words can also be sung to the German song "There is a little rose upon the heath."

The song ends in the chant "Death to the Russians, death to the Russians!" which accompanies visitors on their way through all the Afghan camps.

There is no telling how many Russians have actually been killed in the 12 months since the invasion. The Mujahidin say 15,000; the Soviet high command in Kabul says 1,000. One thing is certain: the Mujahidin have lost several times as many men. But the losses on either side have not been decisive for the outcome of the war.

In December, the rebels started another of their so-called major offensives, the fourth or fifth since the start of the war. But even at rebel headquarters in Peshawar no one thinks it will turn things around. But one is content to show the red giant that the Mujahidin have not given up.

Given the present situation, neither side can hope to win this war. Surprisingly enough, reds and greens tend to agree on the tactical situation. To bring the Mujahidin to their knees, the Kremlin would have to increase the strength of its expeditionary corps from 85,000 to 300,000 men.

"Thank God they have other peoples to keep in check," Mangal Husayn, a member of the Hizb-e-Islami presidium, says. So, for the time being they continue fighting as best they can in hopes that the enemy will one day lose interest in the war.

Almost all of the 12 resident guerilla groups resident in Peshawar are at daggers drawn with each other. Most of them are waging a war on two fronts-- against the Russians and against the competition and beyond that, there is the ever-present threat of private wars between major clans breaking out.

No wonder the Mujahidin strategists in Peshawar are just as unclear as the Soviet secret service about where the front is, if indeed there is one.

All efforts have failed at uniting the wide spectrum of rebel organizations ranging from the enlightened Hizb-e-Islami all the way to the orthodox groups a la Ayatollah under a single leadership. Shortly before Christmas, a Saudi freighter loaded with arms left Karachi and returned to Jidda without having unloaded its cargo because the would-be recipients could not agree on how to divide it up.

Mangal Husayn is somewhat more careful in predicting victory than Nadjibullah, the frontline fighter. "Of course we will win," he says. "Our men are on the offensive in all provinces of the country. But consider this: We are using the arms of our fathers to fight against the weapons of a world power."

Oftentimes they also have to fight on an empty stomach. The scorched earth strategy has destroyed Afghan reserve stocks in many parts of the country. Around Christmas, when an emissary of Ronald Reagan's visited the Afghan refugees, he was greeted by a sign that read: "Bring bread and bullets."

They would not mind if it were a bit more than that-- such as ground-to-air missiles with which the Mujahidin could defend against their greatest bane, the "flying dogs," as they call the heavily armored

Soviet helicopter gunships. "A few carloads of Sa missiles like the Africans in the bush have them-- that would do us fine," Mangal Husayn says.

Not that there is a sudden scarcity of missiles on the grey market. They just cannot clear the political hurdles Pakistan's president Zia ul-Haq has placed in the way of the Afghan rebels' supply lines. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are offering high-quality material in ample amounts but Zia will only let light arms through. "He is afraid of the Russians," Husayn says disdainfully.

Of course he is afraid and not without reason. The Soviets could destabilise Pakistan's internal peace, hard as it was to achieve, in any number of ways. They could incite the rebellious Beluchis to act against the government or urge Pakistan's archenemy India to make a military move on the border.

Just to prove that frontiers are of no consequence when pacification is at issue, the Soviet high command has had its "flying dogs" cross over into Pakistani air space on several occasions. Although Pakistanis were killed on these occasions, Zia merely registered a weak protest.

Thus, Pakistan is hard put to render service to the Islamic cause. The Afghan civil war has set loose a flood of refugees on the border provinces that appears as a threat to the population there. In many villages, the Pakistanis have long since become a minority. The tensions between the natives and the refugees are adding fuel to Pakistan's social problems of which the country had enough even without the refugees.

A million and a half refugees and an equal number of Pushtu irredentists who are not known for their extravagant loyalty are bound to destabilize the nation in the long run.

Pushtus are apt to recall these days that the present-day Pakistani frontier town of Peshawar was the summer residence of the Afghan kings in the 18th century. Islamabad is plagued by a horrible vision of a possible future: a semi-autonomous refugee state along the lines of Lebanon where political and legal disputes are settled with the aid of Kalashnikov rifles.

A vision of the future ? Wherever the Afghan refugees already make up the majority, the populism of the rabblers and bigots is in full command. Girls that go to school are beaten up and sent home; women are forced to wear the veil again. Several schools where co-educational instruction was instituted by the authorities went up in flames during the night.

The Zia government has spent DM 200 million on the refugees. Perhaps that is why the flood shows no sign of abating. Depending on the military situation, 50,000 to 100,000 new arrivals are registered by the refugee reception center in Peshawar each month. The Afghan authorities do not hold the refugees back. They have no interest in halting the flood which tears a big hole each year into the pocket of their archenemy Zia.

In Peshawar and Quetta, refugee aid groups have set up shop that guarantee smooth border crossings against advance payment. The cost for three adults comes to 35,000 Afghanis or about DM 1,500. It includes bus fare to Jallalabad plus the fare to Mulli, experienced guides and box lunches. Children up to the age of 10 are free.

Anyone who has the money can buy a genuine Afghan passport at the Hizb-e-Islami office and if he still has money left, can continue on to Europe. Pakistanis, too, like to avail themselves of this particular service

Ever since the Bonn government made visas obligatory for Pakistanis, "employment agents" who smuggle Pakistanis into the FRG via East Berlin have become customers of Hizb-e-Islami.

The ways of Western aid for the victims of the Soviet invasion are strange indeed. In a warehouse on the edge of Peshawar, the U.N. refugee aid organization has stored all the items it was unable to distribute: 60 tons of tomato ketchup; several hundred briefcases; boxes full of high-heeled shoes and cocktail dresses. And as for World Medical Relief Inc. of Detroit, they sent 16,000 cans of diet food to the starving refugees.

German aid may be nourishing, but sometimes it takes a while to get to its destination. A plane-load full of powdered milk went into storage in Peshawar at first because the superstitious Afghans were convinced it would make them impotent. The rumor is supposed to have been started by a British aid organization that wanted to be the one to help the needy itself.

It took a trick for the German powdered milk to reach those for whom it was intended. Two mixers consisting of iron rods and sheet metal were built and in them the powder was dissolved in water. An unknown graffiti artist then took a piece of chalk and wrote the Afghan words for "milk from iron cows" on the machine.

9478

CSO: 4403

BRIEFS

CANADIAN INDUSTRY MINISTER VISITS--Development and Industry Minister Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi met in his office this morning with (Horst Schmidt), the Canadian minister of state for economic and international trade (name and title as heard) from Alberta Province. The Canadian ambassador to Bahrain and the supervisor of foreign trade relations at the Commerce and Agriculture Ministry, Muhammad (Ajour), attended the meeting. After the meeting the development and industry minister said that the two sides reviewed the areas and feasibility of cooperation between Bahrain and the Canadian Alberta Province, particularly as this province possesses gas and oil and is trying to diversify the sources of its economy. Also, they reviewed technical exchange and the establishment of joint projects in the future. [Text] [GF111221 Manama Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 11 Mar 81]

CSO: 4802

EGYPT

LAW ISSUED ESTABLISHING NATIONAL RAILROAD AUTHORITY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 28, 16 Jul 80
pp 55-62

[Article: "Law No 152 of 1980 Establishing National Egyptian Railroad Authority"]

[Text] In the name of the people,

The president of the republic,

The People's Assembly has ratified this law and we have promulgated it:

Article 1

A national authority called the Egyptian Railroads [sic] shall be established to manage the railroads utility, shall have a legal status person, shall be under the control of the minister of transport, shall be managed in a unified central manner and shall have its headquarters in Cairo and branches in all parts of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This authority shall be subject to the provisions stipulated in this law.

Article 2

The authority, to the exclusion of all others, shall have the power to build and operate railroad networks at the national level, to develop and strengthen them in a manner compatible with their major role in the transport movement and to exert efforts to enable these networks to keep up pace with the requirements of expansion, production and development within the framework of the state's general economic and political plan. To realize this, the authority shall undertake the following in particular:

- A. Build and operate railroad networks and offer services pertaining to them in all parts of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
- B. Build, manage and maintain the installations and equipment necessary to offer these services.
- C. Implement the projects necessary for the realization of its goals, or pertaining to these goals, and develop their services.

Article 3

To realize its objectives, the authority may engage in all activities and works necessary for implementing these objectives, may draw up plans and programs and may adopt the systems of management compatible with its activities in accordance with the provisions of this law and without observing the governmental rules and regulations.

Article 4

Without violating the stipulations of article 2, the authority may, to realize its objectives and with the approval of the minister of transport, set up joint-stock companies on its own or in partnership with others. The shares of these companies may be put into circulation upon the establishment of the companies. The authority workers shall have the first option of purchasing these shares.

Article 5

The authority's capital shall consist of:

1. The funds of the Public Railroad Authority set up in accordance with law No 366 of 1956 establishing a public authority for Egyptian railroad affairs.
2. The funds allocated for it by the state.

Article 6

The authority's revenues shall consist of the following:

1. The sums allocated for it by the state in the general budget.
2. The revenues of the authority's activity and the yield of the works or services it performs for others, whether at home or abroad.
3. The service performance price differences payable to the authority in accordance with the provisions of the the third paragraph of article 12.
4. Grants and aid.
5. The yield of the fines levied in accordance with the law for violation of the regulations applied by the authority.

Article 7

The authority's funds shall be considered public funds.

Article 8

The authority shall have a special budget prepared in accordance with the regulations set by the authority's bylaws and without observation of the laws and regulations governing preparation of the state budget.

The authority shall also have a special account in which it deposits its revenues. The surplus in the authority's budget shall be rotated from year to year.

The authority's fiscal year shall start with the start of the state's fiscal year and shall end by the end of the state's fiscal year.

Article 9

To collect its dues, the authority may adopt the measures of administrative impoundment in accordance with the provisions of the administrative impoundment law.

Article 10

In exception from the provisions of the laws and regulations governing imports and foreign currency, the authority shall, within the limits of its budget, have the power to import directly or through others and without license the production requirements, machinery, equipment, spareparts and transportation means it needs for its activities in accordance with the conditions set by the authority's bylaws.

Article 11

The equipment, machinery and technical apparatuses imported by the authority and needed for the operation of its projects shall, subject to inspection and in accordance with a declaration by the authority stating that the imported materials are for its projects or for its operational activities, be exempted from taxes and customs fees.

The exempted materials may not be disposed of before the lapse of 5 years on the date of exemption, else taxes and customs fees shall be payable for them.

Article 12

The authority's board of directors shall propose the prices for the services performed by the authority [in accordance] with the sound cost accounting procedures and on the bases approved by the board of directors.

A decree shall be issued by the minister of transport setting these prices after they are presented to the Council of Ministers.

In case the state sets the service prices at rates lower than those approved, the state's general budget shall shoulder the resulting differences which must be included in the authority's budget for the next fiscal year.

Article 13

The authority shall determine what part of its budget's investment allocations is to be set aside for research and studies pertaining to its activities, including the research and studies conducted by the authority itself and those entrusted to other circles.

Article 14

The authority shall be managed by:

1. An executive board.
2. A board of directors.
3. Chairman of the executive board.

Article 15

The chairman of the authority's executive board shall be appointed by a presidential decree. The decree shall set the chairman's salary and allowances.

Article 16

The authority shall have an executive board formed under the chairmanship of the executive board chairman and with the membership of:

- A. Three of the authority's directors chosen on a decree by the minister of transport.
- B.. A maximum of 10 members experienced in and concerned with the authority's activity selected to the board membership on a decree by the minister of transport for a renewable term of no more than 2 years. The decree shall determine the recompense to these members.
- C. A member of the authority's general union nominated by the executive board chairman. The executive board may form from among its members one or more committees to which it temporarily entrusts some of its power. The board may also temporarily entrust the board of directors, the executive board chairman or an executive board member with some of its powers or with performing a specific mission.

Article 17

The authority's executive board shall be the agency controlling and managing the authority's affairs. This board may adopt the decisions it deems necessary to realize the objectives for which the authority has been set up without observation of the government rules and regulations. This board shall engage in its powers in the manner outlined by this law. In particular, the board may:

1. Draw up the plans and programs for the authority's activities within the framework of the state's general plan.
2. Formulate the authority's organizational structure.
3. Approve the price categories, tariffs and recompense for the services performed by the authority.
4. Draw up the regulations for the contracts concluded by the authority with those using its services.

5. Draw up the authority's bylaws concerning the technical, financial and administrative affairs, the bylaws concerning purchases and warehouses and other general organizational bylaws.
6. Propose formulation of the bylaws on the appointment and promotion of authority workers, on their allowances and their recompense and on their other job affairs. The bylaws shall be issued on a decree by the minister of transport.
7. Formulate a system of health, social, cultural and athletic care for the authority workers.
8. Formulate a system of control, followup and of performance rates in accordance with the economic criteria.
9. Propose the authority's draft annual budget and its draft final account.
10. Propose the conclusion of internal and foreign loans.
11. Accept the grants and donations offered to the authority and not conflicting with its goals.
12. Conclude agreements within the authority's jurisdiction.
13. Examine the issues that the minister of transport or the executive board chairman decides to present to the board and that are within the minister's or chairman's jurisdiction.

Article 18

The executive board shall meet at the invitation of its chairman once a month or whenever the need arises. The meeting shall lack quorum unless the majority of the members attend. The board's decisions shall be issued by the majority vote of the members attending. In case the votes are equal, the side with the chairman's vote shall be favored.

The board must be summoned to convene if at least half the members request a meeting. The meeting may take place at the authority's headquarters or in any of its branch offices. The board may also invite to its sessions any experts that it seeks to consult without their having a countable vote in the meetings.

Article 19

The authority's executive board chairman shall present the executive board's decisions to the minister of transport for approval within 3 days of the date of their issuance. The minister shall have the right to demand reconsideration of the decisions within 15 days of the date on which they are presented to him. In this case, the decisions shall not be considered valid unless the board approves them a second time with at least a majority of three quarters of the members. However, should 15 days pass on the date on which the decisions are presented to the minister and should the minister fail to act upon the decisions within this period, then the executive board decisions shall be valid as of the end of this period.

Article 20

The board of directors shall be formed on a decree by the minister of transport under the chairmanship of the executive board chairman. A decree shall be issued by the minister of transport outlining this board's working system and procedures.

The board of directors may invite to its sessions any of the authority's personnel members or other experienced people that it wishes to consult.

Article 21

The board of directors is the main agency in the sphere of the authority's operation, work followup, supervision of implementation of the authority's projects and of the development of these projects. This board shall carry out the following:

1. Prepare the authority's draft bylaws.
2. Conduct the studies or research requested by the minister or the executive board.
3. Study the issues included in the executive board's agenda, make observations and present studies and proposals on these issues before they are presented to the executive board.
4. Study the authority's projects and draw up timetables and priorities for their implementation.
5. Study and analyze the periodic and followup reports and outline their significance before they are presented to the executive board.
6. Draw up the policy for personnel training.
7. Propose the methods necessary for developing the authority's activity and for enabling this activity to keep up pace with the international developments.
8. Prepare an annual report to be presented to the minister of transport and the executive board on the progress of work, the accomplishments realized according to the set plan and programs, the obstacles facing performance and the solutions proposed to deal with these obstacles.
9. The other jurisdictions defined by the authority's bylaws.

Article 22

The authority's executive board chairman shall represent the authority before the judiciary and in its relations with others.

Article 23

The executive board chairman shall carry out the following:

1. Implement the decisions of the executive board and of the board of directors.

2. Manage the authority, dispose of its affairs, supervise its system of work and strengthen its agencies.
3. Supply the executive board with the periodic reports, the proposals and the decisions made by the board of directors to guarantee the effectiveness of the executive board and its performance of its tasks as stipulated by the law.
4. Supply the minister of transport and the state agencies with the data, information and documents they request.

The executive board chairman may delegate some of his powers to one or more of the authority's directors.

Article 24

Whoever is to temporarily replace the executive board chairman in case of his absence or in case his position becomes vacant shall be delegated on a decree by the minister of transport.

Article 25

The bylaws stipulated in article 17 shall be issued on a decree by the minister of transport, with the approval of the executive board and without observation of the governmental rules and regulations. The following bases must be taken into consideration in the provisions of these bylaws:

1. Linking wages to the type and nature of work and to performance rates under various circumstances.
2. Make sure that the sum of the travel and transportation allowances paid to authority personnel according to their job grade and their basic allowances does not exceed the sum they actually pay.
3. Adopt the rules of the unified accounting system.

Article 26

This authority shall replace the Public Railroad Affairs Authority established in accordance with the aforementioned law No 366 of 1956 and shall assume the public authority's rights and commitments. The workers of the Public Railroad Affairs Authority shall be transferred to this authority in their existing job conditions and status and without the need for any other measures.

Until the bylaws stipulated in provision 6 of article 17 are issued, the stipulation of provision 2 of the preceding article shall be enforced. Otherwise, the valid bylaws and regulations in the Public Railroad Affairs Authority shall continue to be in force in whatever is not in conflict with provisions of this law.

Article 27

Law No 366 of 1956 and presidential decree No 2715 of 1966 considering the Public Railroad Affairs Authority a public authority in implementation of law No 61 of 1963 concerning the issuance of public authority laws shall be abolished. Any provision conflicting with the provisions of this law shall also be abolished.

Article 28

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect on the day following its publication.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of the state laws.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 14 July 1980.

Anwar al-Sadat

8494

CSO: 4802

LAW ESTABLISHES NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 28, 14 Jul 80
pp 63-71

[Article: "Law No 153 of 1980 Establishing National Telecommunications Authority"]

[Text] In the name of the people,

The president of the republic,

The People's Assembly has ratified the following law and we have promulgated it:

Article 1

An authority called the National Telecommunications Authority shall be established, shall have a legal status person, shall be under the control of the minister of communications and shall be managed in a unified central manner. The authority's headquarters shall be in Cairo and it shall have branch offices in all parts of the Arab Republic of Egypt. This authority shall be subject to the provisions stipulated in this law.

Article 2

The authority, to the exclusion of all others, shall undertake the construction and operation of telecommunication networks at the national level and shall link them internationally within the framework of the state's general political and economic plan. To realize this, the authority shall undertake the following in particular:

- A. Build telecommunication networks in all parts of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
- B. Offer wire and wireless telephone services.
- C. Manage and maintain the installations and equipment necessary for offering these services.
- D. Implement the projects necessary for the implementation of its goals or connected with these goals and develop its services in a manner that guarantees that they keep up pace with the international standard in these spheres.

E. Cooperation with states and international organizations to link the Arab Republic of Egypt with the outside world.

Article 3

To realize its objectives, the authority may engage in all the activities and works necessary for the achievement of these objectives, may draw up plans and programs and may adopt the management methods compatible with its activity in accordance with the provisions of this law and without observation of the governmental rules and regulations.

Article 4

Without violating the provisions of article 2, the authority may, to realize its objectives and with the approval of the minister of communications, set up joint-stock companies on its own or in partnership with others. The shares of these companies may be put into circulation immediately upon the establishment of the companies. The authority workers shall have the first option to purchasing these shares.

Article 5

The authority's capital shall consist of:

1. The funds of the Public Telecommunications Authority established in accordance with presidential decree No 709 of 1957 on the creation of the Egyptian Public Authority for Telecommunication Affairs.
2. The sums allocated for it by the state.

Article 6

The authority's revenues shall consist of:

1. The sums allocated for it by the state in the general budget.
2. The revenues of the authority's activity and the yield of the services and works performed by the authority for others both at home abroad.
3. The service performance price differences payable to the authority in accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of article 12.
4. The loans concluded for the authority.
5. Grants and aid.
6. The revenues of the fines levied in accordance with the law for violation of the regulations applied by the authority.

Article 7

The authority's funds shall be considered public funds.

Article 8

The authority shall have a private budget prepared in accordance with the rules set by the bylaws and without observation of the laws and regulations governing preparation of the state budget. The authority shall also have a private account in which it deposits its revenues. The surplus in the authority's budget shall be rotated from year to year. The authority's fiscal year shall begin with the start of the state's fiscal year and shall end with its end.

Article 9

To collect its dues, the authority may adopt administrative impoundment measures in accordance with the provisions of the administrative impoundment law.

Article 10

In exception from the provisions of the laws and bylaws regulating imports and foreign currency, the authority may, within the limits of its budget, import on its or through others the production requirements, the materials, the machinery, the equipment, the spareparts and the transportation means necessary for its activity in accordance with the rules and on the conditions and terms set by the authority's bylaws.

Article 11

The equipment, machinery and technical apparatuses imported by the authority and necessary for operating the authority's projects shall be exempted from taxes and customs fees, subject to inspection and in accordance with a declaration by the authority stating that the imported materials are for its projects or for their operational activity.

The exempted goods may not be disposed of before the lapse of 5 years on the date of exemption, else taxes and customs fees shall be payable for them.

Article 12

The authority's executive board shall propose the prices for the services performed by the authority in accordance with the sound accounting systems and with the bases approved by the executive board.

A decree setting these prices shall be issued by the minister of communication after it is presented to the Council of Ministers.

In case the state sets for the services prices lower than those approved, the state budget shall shoulder the resulting differences and these differences shall be included in the authority's budget for the next fiscal year.

Article 13

The authority shall set the part of the investment appropriations included in its budget for research and studies connected with its activity and undertaken by the authority itself or entrusted to other circles.

Article 14

The administrative authorities concerned with building affairs shall notify the authority of permits for buildings with an elevation of 30 or more meters and the authority may construct technical installations in such buildings to facilitate telecommunication.

Article 15

The authority shall be managed by:

1. An executive board.
2. A board of directors.
3. Chairman of the executive board.

Article 16

The authority's executive board chairman shall be appointed by presidential decree. The decree shall set the chairman's salary and allowances.

Article 17

The authority shall have an executive board formed under the chairmanship of the executive board chairman and with the membership of:

- A. Three of the authority's directors selected on a decree by the minister of communications.
- B. Six members experienced in and concerned with the authority's activity. A decree by the minister of communications shall be issued appointing them to the board membership for a renewable term of no more than 2 years and determining their recompense.
- C. A member of the authority's general union nominated by the executive board.

The executive board may form from among its members one or more committees and may delegate temporarily some of its powers to these committees. The executive board may also delegate temporarily some of its powers to the board of directors, the executive board chairman or an executive board member or may entrust any of them with a specific mission.

Article 18

The authority's executive board shall be the agency in charge of the authority and of disposing of its affairs. This board may adopt whatever decisions it deems

necessary for realizing the objectives for which the authority has been established and shall exercise its powers in the manner outlined by this law. In particular, the executive board may undertake the following:

1. Draw up the authority's plans and programs within the framework of the state's general plan.
2. Formulate the authority's organizational structure.
3. Approve the price categories, the tariffs and the wages for the services performed by the authority.
4. Draw up the rules concerning the contacts concluded by the authority with those using its services.
5. Draw up the authority's bylaws concerning the technical, financial and administrative affairs, the bylaws concerning purchases and warehouses and other general organizational bylaws.
6. Propose formulation of the bylaws concerning appointment and promotion of the authority workers and concerning their salaries, allowances and recompense and other job-related affairs. These bylaws shall be issued on a decree by the minister of communications.
7. Formulate a system of health, social, cultural and athletic care for the authority's workers.
8. Draw up a control, followup and performance rates system in accordance with the economic criteria.
9. Approve the annual draft budget and its draft final account.
10. Propose the concluding of domestic and foreign loans.
11. Accept grants and donations offered to the authority and not conflicting with its goals.
12. Conclude agreements within the authority's jurisdiction.
13. Examine the issues that the minister of communications or the executive board chairman decides to refer to the executive board and that are within the minister's or the chairman's jurisdiction.

Article 19

The executive board shall meet at the invitation of its chairman once a month or whenever the need arises. The meeting shall lack quorum unless the majority of the members are present. The board's decision shall be issued by the majority vote of the members present. When the votes are equal, the side with the chairman's vote shall be favored.

The board must be summoned to convene if at least one half its members request such a meeting. The meeting shall take place at the authority's headquarters or at any of its branch offices. The board may invite to its sessions any experts it seeks to consult, without their having a countable vote in the meeting.

Article 20

The authority's executive board chairman shall present the board's decisions to the minister of communications for approval within 3 days of the date of their issuance. The minister shall have the right to demand reconsideration of the decisions within 15 days of the date on which the decisions are presented to him. In this case, the decisions shall not be valid unless approved a second time by at least a majority of three quarters of the board members. However, should the 15-day period pass on the date of presentation of the decisions to the minister and should the minister fail to make a decision on them during this period, the executive board's decisions shall be valid as of the end of this period.

Article 20

The board of directors shall be formed on a decree by the minister of communications under the chairmanship of the executive board chairman. A decree shall be issued by the minister of communications outlining the work system and procedures of this board.

The board may invite to its sessions any authority personnel members or other experienced people it wishes to consult.

Article 22

The board of directors is the main agency in the sphere of the authority's operation, of following up the progress of its work and of supervising implementation of the projects undertaken by the authority. The board of directors shall undertake the following:

1. Prepare the authority's draft bylaws.
2. Conduct the studies and research requested by the minister or by the executive board.
3. Study the issues included in the executive board's agenda, make observations and submit studies and proposals on them before they are presented to the executive board.
4. Study the authority's projects and draw up their timetables and priorities.
5. Study and analyze the periodic and followup reports before they are presented to the executive board.
6. Formulate the personnel training policy.
7. Propose the methods needed to develop the authority's activity and to enable it to keep up pace with the international developments.

8. Prepare an annual report to be presented to the minister of communications and to the executive board on the progress of work, on the accomplishments made in accordance with the set plans and programs, on the obstacles facing performance and on the solutions proposed to deal with them.

9. The other tasks defined by the authority's bylaws.

Article 23

The executive board chairman shall represent the authority before the judiciary and in the authority's relations with others.

Article 24

The executive board chairman shall undertake the following:

1. Implement the decisions of the executive board and of the board of directors.
2. Manage the authority, dispose of its affairs, supervise its system of work and bolster its agencies.
3. Supply the executive board with the studied reports, proposals and decisions of the board of directors in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the executive board and its undertaking of the tasks stipulated by the law.
4. Supply the minister of communications and the state agencies with the data, information or documents they request.
5. The other tasks defined by the authority's bylaws.

The executive board chairman may delegate some of his powers to one or more of the authority's directors.

Article 25

Whoever is to temporarily replace the executive board chairman in case of his absence or in case his position is vacant shall be delegated by a decree from the minister of communications.

Article 26

The bylaws stipulated in article 18 shall be issued on a decree by the minister of communications, with the approval of the authority's executive board and without observation of the governmental rules and regulations.

The provisions of these bylaws shall take the following into consideration:

1. Linking wages to the type and nature of work and to the performance rates under various circumstances.

The sum of the travel allowances and transportation expenses paid to the authority personnel, each according to his job grade or basic recompense, shall not exceed the sum of the actual expenses that they shoulder.

3. Adoption of the unified accounting system.

Article 27

This authority shall replace the Telecommunications Authority established in accordance with the aforementioned presidential decree No 709 of 1957 with all its rights and its commitments. The workers of the Telecommunications Authority shall be transferred to the new authority with their job conditions and status and without the need for any further measures.

Until the bylaws stipulated in provision 6 of article 18 of this law are issued, the stipulation of provision 2 of the preceding article shall be enacted. Otherwise, the regulations and bylaws in force in the Telecommunications Authority shall continue to be valid in all that is not conflict with the provisions of this law.

Article 28

The aforementioned presidential decree No 709 of 1957 shall be abolished, and so shall every provision conflicting with the provisions of this law.

Article 29

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect on the day following its publication.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 14 July 1980

Anwar al-Sadat

8494

CSO: 4802

TUDEH PARTY CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO KHOMEYNI

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 10 Feb 81 p 1

[Text] To Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic

The Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran extends hearty best wishes to Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the splendid second anniversary of the great revolution of the people of Iran.

The splendid revolution of 22 Bahman [11 February] is an extremely important milestone in the history of our country which brought with it the elusion of infernal imperialist domination under world-devouring America's leadership, and salvation from the miserable yoke of a dependent, despotic, anti-humanitarian regime for an exploited nation and a tormented people. After years of living in blackness, corruption, and deprivation, our people succeeded in achieving self-government and mastery of their own fate.

The splendid revolution of 22 Bahman is now making its way forward with difficulty, surrounded by countless plots being planned by plundering American imperialism, its allies and agents, and numerous counterrevolutionary desecrations by its proteges, in their various guises.

We have no doubt, however, that the self-sacrificing masses of our homeland, in continuing on the path that has been forged by Imam Khomeyni's anti-imperialist and peoples' line, the revolution will emerge from the chains of an imposed war and its numerous political and economic problems, and will make its way towards even greater victories.

Victory to the anti-imperialist and peoples' war of 22 Bahman!

Long live the leadership of Imam Khomeyni!

Long live the combative people of Iran!

Unity for the people of Iran in defending the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran!

Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran
First Secretary: Nureldin Kianuri
20/11/1359 [10 Feb 1980]

TUDEH PARTY DENIAL OF DELIVERY OF SOVIET ARMS TO IRAQ

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 7 Feb 81 pp 1, 2

(Text) France gives weapons to Iraq, England wants to give Iraq weapons, but the media imperialists point to the Soviets!

The duty of the Americanized Maoists, followers of the Brzezinski line, is clear, but how long must the press be loyal to the Imam's line and the Islamic Republic of Iran's radio and television remain in the clutches of the media imperialists?

This is an old trick the imperialists use every time they want to perpetrate a new crime. Every time one of their crimes is exposed, the media imperialists put their entire hellish apparatus to work accusing the anti-imperialists of the same or similar crimes by spreading lies or fabricating news in order to at least diminish the wrath of the people and the revolutionary forces towards imperialism, and, in their imagination, to strike a blow at the integrity and credit of the anti-imperialist forces by letting on that the other side is no better than they are.

This propaganda tactic has been used again and again, in the 2 years since the Iranian revolution, by the media imperialists. Every time the American imperialists have organized a new plot or interference against the Iranian revolution, and every time a plot has failed and the imperialists have come out looking more disreputable and dishonorable, the media imperialists have published and fabricated totally false information about intervention by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to plot against the Iranian revolution or help its enemies.

The reaction of domestic forces to these domestic plots can be divided into two categories:

First are those who work for the imperialists and submit to them, the Americanized Maoists and the liberals loyal to the Brzezinski line, who have always spread these lies in abundance with satisfaction and contentment exactly the way the imperialists want them to do, and sometimes with even more enthusiasm, and who are kept busy putting forth their "innovations" to save the imperialists from taking a beating and to clear the way for the implementation of their plots.

In the second group are the true and revolutionary Moslems, who are fighting American imperialism and its plots. They have very often inadvertently fallen into the media imperialists' propaganda net and have in effect moved in the same direction.

Two years of fruitful revolutionary experience have opened the eyes of a great many of these forces to the essence of imperialist propaganda. Unfortunately, however, it is still often the case that the imperialist propaganda machine catches them in its broad net.

The most recent example of a media imperialist plot was the publication of the false news of arms sales to Iraq by the Soviet Union, which has often been done before, this time for the purpose of exonerating the French imperialists, who sell arms to the Saddam regime, the English imperialists, who want to give arms to Iraq, and in reality, world imperialism, led by the American imperialists, who are collaborating to implicate the Soviet Union with them in plotting against the Iranian revolution. Unfortunately, some of the anti-imperialist Moslem forces--the liberals and the Americanized Maoists work of their own accord--have been caught in the net and are being dragged along.

France Gives Weapons to Iraq, England Wants to Give Iraq Weapons, but the Media Imperialists Point to the Soviets

While world imperialism is equipping Iraq by way of France and the French Government itself confirms that it is transferring Mirages and tanks to Iraq, in the last few days the imperialist news agencies and mass media have again been kicking up a fuss about "Soviet arms shipments to Iraq."

The initiators of the new phase of propaganda, which is indeed a cover up for the equipping of Saddam's invading army by world imperialism by way of France, were the DAILY TELEGRAPH and the FINANCIAL TIMES. English capitalist imperialist organs, which wrote: "Soviets give 100 tanks to Iraq through Saudi Arabia." Unfortunately, this item was broadcast over all the radio and television stations.

Since the beginning of Saddam's invasion of Iran, despite official denials by the Soviet Union, imperialist reports have announced that the Soviets are giving arms to Iraq through the Gulf of 'Aqaba in Jordan. Since this lie was discredited, however, this time they announced that it was "through Saudi Arabia."

Following the articles in the DAILY TELEGRAPH and the FINANCIAL TIMES, imperialist news agencies quoted "American officials" and others as saying that Soviet arms and tanks are going to Iraq "through Saudi Arabia!"

The propaganda defenses on all sides which have been launched in the last few days by imperialist news agencies and mass media in defense of the stupid "through Saudi Arabia" lie in order to obscure the arming of the Saddam regime by France and to justify arms shipments to Iraq from England and the other Persian Gulf countries show to what an extent world imperialism acts with one accord.

On the other hand, the authors of the "through Saudi Arabia" view, like it or not, had another issue in mind, and that was "the accommodation of two superpowers", so to speak. The Saudi Arabian regime, which could not last even 1 minute without the support of its American masters, and whose frantic maneuvers to please its American masters we saw at the last so-called Islamic conference, (and even now we see how American imperialist middlemen work to organize a new military pact in the Persian Gulf on the order of CENTO) and which was praised several days ago by the Carter Secretary of Defense (the American Secretary of Defense said that the Security of Saudi Arabia is a matter of fundamental importance for America) is giving the Soviets access for transport! Therefore they have "accommodated two superpowers!" The professional liars have gotten so awash in their own propaganda that they have "forgotten" that the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia do not even have diplomatic relations!

A Study of the 'News'

The newspaper SOBH-E AZADEGAN, which is loyal to the Imam's line and has proven its steadfastness in the struggle against American imperialism and liberal accommodationists, has unfortunately been caught in the net of this media imperialist plot, and without considering the source and the purpose of the publication of the false news of the shipment of arms to Iraq from the Soviets and other socialist countries, and "through Saudi Arabia" to boot, has published this news with full enthusiasm. On Thursday, 16 Bahman, 1359 [5 February 1981] the headline "100 Soviet-Made Tanks sent to Iraq" appeared on the front page of SOBH-E AZADEGAN, and on page 12, in larger type, the headline "100 Soviet-Made Tanks Have Been Sent to Iraq Through Saudi Arabia" was used as a news item. What does a study of the "news" show, however?

Publisher of the news: UNITED PRESS and REUTERS. (Since when have these two agencies been truthful?)

Source of the news: Official American sources. (Since when have official American sources been truthful?)

Text of the news

First part of the news: "Official American sources said that 100 Soviet-made tanks have been sent to Iraq through Saudi Arabia from Poland and East Germany. American sources said that Saudi Arabia has authorized the shipment of tanks and large trailers through its territory."

Note: Many readers, who only read the headlines in the newspapers, only consider the headline in the above item, paying no attention to the text. In this way, the intent of the media imperialists is fulfilled as far as these readers are concerned, and the theory of "accommodating two superpowers", or "sharing of shame," is propagated.

Another group of newspaper readers, who do not stop at the headlines but also read the first part of the news, will read the text of the headlines again, which has been taken from that part.

Second part of the news: "American officials said that Moscow has given military equipment to Iraq in accordance with a treaty it has with that country, but it has not given tanks or aircraft to Iraq since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war last fall!" (SOBH-E AZADEGAN, 16 Bahman, 1359)

Note: Some readers, after reading the first part of the news, which makes up the first few paragraphs of the article, continue reading. It is in this continuation, however, or in the second part of the news, that the essence of the "news" becomes clear. The media imperialists, who lost no time after the Start of the Saddam regime's invasion of Iran in pooling all their efforts to spread strange lies about Soviet arms sales to Iraq, now admit that (the Soviets) "have not given tanks or aircraft to Iraq since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war last fall."

A reader who has read this far will ask himself: So why has the Soviet Union changed its mind now, and decided to sell arms to Iraq, "through Saudi Arabia" yet?

The reader will find no answer to this question, unless he reads to the end of the article.

Note: The third part of the media imperialists' article, which perhaps only an insignificant percentage of the readers will read, evidently either repudiates the source of the news or questions it.

Third part of the news: "United Press reported that the TASS news agency denied Western allegations that Soviet-made tanks have recently been sent to Iraq through Saudi Arabia. TASS said that these allegations were baseless and absurd, and their only purpose was to justify English arms shipments to the area. The English press had previously reported that Soviet-made tanks had been sent to Iraq through Saudi Arabia!" (SOBH-E AZADEGAN, 16 Bahman, 1359)

Apart from the newspaper SOBH-E AZADEGAN, which unfortunately has not yet understood the media imperialists and their tricks, committed publications loyal to the Imam's line such as KEYHAN and JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI have also fallen in this dangerous media imperialist net in various ways, and have unwittingly given aid to media imperialist rabble-rousing by publishing imperialist fabricated reports.

On the front page of its 15 Bahman [4 February] issue, KEYHAN echoed the media imperialist lie with the headline "Warsaw Pact Sends 108 Tanks to Iraq," and in the text of the article, after the manner of the media imperialists which we are considering, printed the very same report used by the French press. The French press began by enthusiastically presenting the fabricated news "Warsaw Pact Arms Sales to Iraq through Saudi Arabia." Then it provided information about the reality of French imperialist arms sales to Iraq and thus actually tried to cover up France's ignominy. KEYHAN, unfortunately, has not yet become aware of this trick used by the French press.

The newspaper loyal to the Imam's line, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, although it did not feature the fabricated media imperialist news prominently, unfortunately also spoke of "world collaboration among the superpowers," the shipment of "100 T-54 and T-55 tanks belonging to the Warsaw Pact armory to Iraq through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" at the beginning of an article dated 15 Bahman under the heading "France collaborates with America," which itself constitutes acceptance of the media imperialist lies.

It is no doubt necessary to recall how the liberal publications loyal to the Brzezinski line and the Americanized Maoists received this media imperialists plot. They knowingly disseminate these imperialist news agency fabrications, in order to accomplish their objective, which is to take the heat off the imperialists and to undermine relations between Iran and the Soviets.

Newspapers like SOBH-E AZADEGAN, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, AND KEYHAN, however, which are loyal to the Imam's line, must become familiar with these dangerous pitfalls and avoid falling into them. Media imperialist plots must be met with open eyes and ears and alert minds, and they must be thwarted.

9310

CSO: 4906

QASEMLU SAID TO HAVE 'JOINED WITH BAKHTIAR'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Feb 81 p 3

[Text] After visiting several European countries, including France, Qasemlu told BBC in an interview:

"There are people seeking power in Europe with whom I am in contact.

"The Democratic Party hopes to form a front made up of groups opposed to the regime in Iran in order to prepare an alternative future government for Iran.

"The Mojahedin Organization is ready to cooperate with the Democratic Party."

The weekly newsletter CHRISTIAN INTERNATIONAL from the Central News Office in London reported in this week's issue that 'Abdolrahman Qasemlu finally revealed his true colors and aligned himself with Shapur Bakhtiar. Qasemlu is still the leader of the Kordestan Democratic Party. He opposes the Kurds of Iraq and helps Saddam. As quoted in LE MONDE of Paris, this newsletter wrote that Iraq's objective in attacking Iran was to occupy Khuzestan, to separate Kordestan with the help of the counter-revolution, and to proclaim a free government led by Shapur Bakhtiar in Ahvaz, on 15 October (23 Mehr).

Bakhtiar and Oveysi operate 2 radio stations in Baghdad, from which they issue the necessary orders for their sympathizers within Iran. It must be recalled that recently the newspaper MOJAHED, the organ of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, interviewed Qasemlu and defended Qasemlu's position in issue number 19 of MOJAHED.

On Thursday the newspaper ETTELA'AT said:

'Abdolrahman Qasemlu told BBC radio (London) in an interview that there is still a group of people seeking power in Europe who are left over from the Shah's regime, and that he is in contact with them.

Qasemlu, who spoke with the BBC after seeing several European countries such as France, added: The Democratic Party hopes to form a front made up of all groups opposed to the regime in Iran in order to prepare an alternative future government for Iran. Qasemlu said that the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization is prepared to cooperate with the Democratic Party.

Qasemlu added: In addition to the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the party has the support of other groups in Kordestan.

'Abdolrahman Qasemlu also noted: Abolhassan Bani Sadr is not without interest in the desires of the Kurds. He added that when Mr Bani Sadr was elected to the presidency, he told a group of representatives we had sent that he was in accord with our demands, which had been articulated in six principles, but that unfortunately the Revolutionary Council has rejected the demands. We think that perhaps Bani Sadr did not have the power to prevail upon the Revolutionary Council to accept these demands. We hope that one day he will have such power.

9310

CSO: 4906

CREATION OF GROUPS, MANIPULATION OF GROUPS EXAMINED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 3 Mar 81 p 12

[Text] This has been an age-old way [of operation] of colonialism, and naturally there is nothing new about it [creation of groups for manipulation]. Colonialist countries have tried, dating back to old times, to bring into existence apparently Islamic groups, in order to preserve the interdependence of Islamic countries to the West, or to intensify [the already] existing ties. We will, in the near future, present tens of affiliated groups and minigroups, [operating] under the guise of Islamic, Marxist and other labels, in order to prove that even in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran, the United States has spared no efforts to find a means of infiltration. If indeed those plans are being defeated one after another, it should be ascribed to the everincreasing vigilance and awareness of the people, and the wisdom of the leadership and the capacity of this revolution.

According to information reaching from Afghanistan, the United States is making efforts to create an affiliated guerrilla force, aimed at disbanding the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan from within the movement. The formation of such a guerrilla force pursues several targets as follows:

1. By the creation of such a force the U.S. pretends to be a supporter of Islamic movements, and thus its mercenaries [residing] in the area would have an apparently acceptable justification for defending U.S. interests in the area as a power supporting Islam!
2. By the formation of such a force the U.S. intends to penetrate the genuinely devoted struggling forces, who are shouldering the major burden of the struggle waged against the occupation force, preventing thus the victory of a genuine Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.
3. By publicizing the U.S.-affiliated groups, the U.S. provides the best pretext for the Soviet Union, so that the latter may suppress the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan as a U.S.-inspired movement. On the other hand, the U.S.-affiliated groups are chanting slogans only outside the country. They do not have any base among the people, and, as a result, they do not have the slightest participation in the struggles waged by the people of Afghanistan. Naturally, based on this reality, no harm and injuries will be sustained by the affiliated groups, and the genuine forces [fighting in the country] will be attacked severely by the Soviet Union. This will be of some service to the U.S., giving it the opportunity to take vengeance upon the genuine forces of Islam by means of Soviet soldiers.

4. By publicizing the affiliated groups, the U.S. intends to channelize the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan through a premeditated course. Recently the Western, and especially the American news agencies have been making efforts to publicize the visit to the United States of the leader of one Afghan affiliated group, called Seyyed Ahmad Geylani, who has been presented by the Associated Press as "the leader of one of the six major resistance groups." Whereas so far he has not displayed any other "resistance" except meeting with Sadat, the traitor; [certain] U.S. State Department officials; U.S. senators, including Zionist senator Javits; Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, experienced middle-man of Zionism; Graham, former chief of intelligence of the Pentagon; and the Sultan of Oman!

The writer of these lines while deliberating privately, was tempted to think that probably the treacherous Tudehites may tomorrow write [in their papers] that haven't we been saying [all the time] that Afghans are pro-American? But our response to that will be quite definite: Because of the existence of the treacherous Tudehites in Iran, should one accept Reagan's statement, according to which all conditions necessary for a Tudeh take-over in Iran have been provided and made available?

And, who knows, maybe the strengthening of the Tudehites in Iran, and the strengthening of U.S.-affiliated groups in Afghanistan have been prearranged on the basis of a bilateral [Soviet & U.S.] agreement!

CSO: 4906

PAPER DETAILS 1981-1985 FIVE YEAR-PLAN

JN190945 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 19 Mar 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by Janab Tutunji, special to the JORDAN TIMES]

[Text] Amman, 18 March--Jordan's new five-year plan (1981-85), whose main features were revealed to the National Consultative Council this week, envisages massive investment in industry and mining, a growing role for the productive sector, the government financing its current spending from domestic revenues alone by 1985 and a progressive narrowing of Jordan's chronic trade deficit.

The volume of projected investments in the plan is placed at JD 2,800 million at current prices, and will be shared equally between the public and private sector.

Forty-nine percent of total investments will go into the commodity producing sectors and tourism, while 51 percent will go into infrastructure projects, the services sector and social services.

The plan envisages a 10.4 percent annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP), or a 64 percent increase at 1980 prices during the five years of the plan, from JD 705 million in 1980 to JD 1.156 million in 1985.

The largest single investment will be in the area of industry and mining (JD 604 million), followed by transport (JD 463 million), then water and irrigation, which will get the same amount as housing (JD 338 million each), then education, culture and information (JD 215 million), and agriculture, which is to get JD 214 million.

The breakdown of investments is as follows:

- Industry and Mining, JD 604 million;
- Transport, JD 463 million;
- Water and Irrigation, JD 338 million;
- Housing, JD 338 million;
- Education, Culture and Information, JD 215 million;
- Agriculture, JD 214 million;
- Electrical Power, JD 163 million;
- Municipal and Rural Affairs, JD 144 million;
- Communications, JD 93 million;
- Health, JD 68 million;

Tourism, JD 54 million;
Labour and Social Development, JD 42 million;
Trade, JD 33 million;
Royal Scientific Society and Department of Statistics, JD 10 million;
Religious Endowments (Awqaf), JD 6 million;
Other, JD 15 million.

Important goals of the plan are to increase the share of the commodity sector in gross domestic product while trimming the share of the services sector, increasing domestic government revenues so that they will cover current government spending by the end of the plan, and reducing the deficit in the balance of trade.

Economic integration with Arab countries is to be boosted. Arab and other foreign investments are to be attracted through legal amendments. Export-oriented industries will be promoted, emphasis will be put on manufacturing and complementary industries, the introduction of modern technology will be favoured and value added in industries using locally available raw materials will be increased as will value added in agricultural production.

Priority in project investment will go to commodity production, social services and infrastructure projects which will foster economic integration with neighbouring Arab countries.

Due consideration will be given to balanced regional development within the country. Local energy sources will be developed and water and energy conservation plans adopted.

Sectoral aims of the plan are:

A. Boosting income from agriculture by about 40 percent as compared with 1980, at an annual growth rate of 7 percent, by expanding the irrigated cultivated area in the Jordan Valley and the southern Ghor [valley] region, improving cultivation methods in irrigated and rain-fed areas and increasing livestock production. Value added in agricultural production is to be increased.

B. Increasing income from industry and mining from JD 154 million in 1980 to JD 335 million in 1985 (at 1980 prices), which will represent an increase of 117.5 percent at an annual growth rate of 17 percent.

Industrial and mining projects begun in the previous plan will be continued. Chemical industries using raw phosphates and potash will be developed, cement production will be boosted and medium scale and small manufacturing industries of a complementary nature will be promoted and diversified, particularly mining and export-oriented industries.

C. The share of the commodity producing sectors in gross national product is to rise from 38.8 percent in 1980 to 44.8 percent in 1985, at an annual growth rate of 13.5 percent. Joint ventures with Arab partners are to be encouraged and inter-Arab trade promoted.

D. Income from the services sector (transport, trade, services of financial institutions, house rental, public administration, defence, social and personal services) will go up from JD 431 million in 1980 to JD 639 million in 1985 (at 1980 prices), representing an increase of 48.3 percent at an annual growth rate of 8.2 percent as compared to 13.5 percent for the commodity-producing sector.

E. Income from the construction sector is to go up from JD 52 million in 1980 to JD 81 million in 1985 at 1980 prices, an increase of 56.2 percent at an annual growth rate of 9.3 percent.

F. Income from electricity generation and supply of water for agriculture, industry and household use is to go up from JD 8 million in 1980 to JD 17 million in 1985, an increase of 112.5 percent at an annual growth rate of 16.3 percent.

Other significant aspects of the plan are:

A. The plan envisages a dramatic increase in domestic government revenues, from 70 percent of current government expenditure in 1980 to 100.4 percent in 1985. This requires that domestic revenues should increase at an annual rate of 20 percent (which is lower than the 22.4 percent annual increase registered during the 1976-80 plan) and that the annual increase in current government expenditures be kept at 12.5 percent or lower during the first three years of the plan, and within a ceiling of 10 percent during the last two years.

B. Although the trade deficit in goods and services will increase from JD 525 million in 1980 to JD 653 million in 1985, the actual ratio of the deficit to gross national product will fall from 51.9 percent to 41.5 percent. It is projected that imports of goods and services will grow at an annual rate of 11.9 percent, while goods and services exports are expected to grow at an annual rate of 19.8 percent due to an increase in and diversification of exports, increased earnings from tourism and greater remittances from Jordanians working abroad.

C. Jordan plans to increase the number of industrial and vocational training schools and set better standards for them. It is expected that 8,000 people will graduate from industrial training centres during the period of the plan, and that by 1985, 30 percent of secondary school students will be undergoing vocational training.

The plan will rely on continued Arab financial support of the government budget to the tune of at least JD 244 million a year. Soft foreign loans amounting to JD 880 million will be secured during the plan period, some of which will go to financing joint ventures with the private sector.

The government will count on domestic revenues increasing by 20 percent annually, keeping increases in its current expenditures down to 12.5 percent during the first three years and to 10 percent during the last two years of the plan and increasing public capital expenditures from 37 percent of total expenditures in 1980 to an annual average of 45 percent for the duration of the plan.

Development bonds worth JD 87 million will be issued during the plan period, and the treasury will continue to borrow from the Central Bank.

The government will meanwhile phase out its subsidies for fuel and basic consumer goods.

Local municipal revenues will have to increase by over 25 percent annually, and municipalities will also have to keep growth in spending down to 12.5 percent annually for the first three years, and then to 10 percent for the remaining two years.

Municipal investments will be directed to public utilities which will bring in returns. Rates for services provided by such utilities will be designed to recover the investment cost and cover running expenses. Such utilities will operate on a purely commercial basis.

An inheritance tax and a capital gains tax on real estate will be imposed, the income tax law revised and collection methods tightened up. Customs on luxury items and alcoholic beverages will be increased, as will the tax on cigarettes.

Customs duties on raw materials and intermediate products used in industry will be revised to encourage local industry and boost exports. Temporary entry procedures for raw materials used in export industries will be facilitated, and a tax will be imposed on raw mineral exports. Tax exemptions, as part of the "encouragement of investment" law, will be made more comprehensive.

Government corporations will have to operate on a more commercial basis, and commercial borrowing from abroad will be restricted to profitable productive ventures.

The government or the pension fund will issue bonds convertible into shares in public shareholding corporations which will engage in productive ventures. The corporations law will be amended to allow for this, and the charter of the pension fund will be amended to enable it to act as an investment corporation, to finance its operations through borrowing and to issue bonds and convertible bonds.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRANIANS SUPPORT KHOMEYNI--A large group of the Iranian community living in Kuwait participated in the great ceremony held yesterday in the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Kuwait. During this ceremony the Iranian community reiterated its support for the Islamic revolution in Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni. The Iranians also expressed their readiness to go to the fronts of conflict between truth and falsehood in order to confront agent Saddam's mercenaries. At the beginning of the ceremony, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Kuwait, Brother 'Ali Shams Ardakani, delivered a speech in which he explained the imperialist plots against the region and the importance of confronting these plots. He also referred to the problems and needs of the Iranian workers living in Kuwait. Then Friday prayers, led by Hojjat ol-Eslam (Akhawan Khorasani), were held. The ceremony concluded with a film featuring the stages that led to the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The film was received with remarkable attention and interest by the participants. [Text] [GP071639 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 7 Mar 81]

CSO: 4802

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--Brother Muhammad Sulayman Nasir, member of the Central Committee and minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, received in his office this morning Comrade Vladimir Mordvinov, deputy chairman of the state committee for foreign economic relations in the USSR Council of Ministers. A discussion took place on issues of agricultural development and the Soviet Union's contribution to agricultural projects in the fields of agricultural consumption and investment, constructing agricultural workshops, training Yemeni cadres and the utilization of Soviet experts carrying out various activities in the agricultural sector. Also examined were proposals for maximum utilization of land and agricultural machinery and equipment, the speedy construction of workshops and implementation of various agricultural projects being provided by the friendly Soviet Union.
[Text] [LD182320 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 18 Mar 81]

CSO: 4802

DOCUMENTARY AIMS TO CORRECT MISINFORMATION ABOUT COUNTRY

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 3-6 Mar 81 p 7

[Text]

Al-KHOBAR, — In the minds of many — perhaps most — Americans in the United States, Saudi Arabia appears nothing more than "one large sand dune with some sort of city in the middle of it from where commerce goes on. And that's it." It was just such misinformation, stereotyping and lack of knowledge which motivated American television producer Jo Franklin-Trout to spend months together to make a three-part documentary which she hopes will shatter the "almost total lack of knowledge about Saudi Arabia in America."

While the filming of the series has been accomplished during a two-month marathon extending to all corners of the Kingdom from Najran to Hail to Jubail to the Rub Al Khali, research and planning has proceeded for more than a year. This preparation enabled Mrs. Franklin-Trout to approach many Saudi Arabian officials for interviews with a degree of expertise not shared by many of her colleagues in the U.S.

"It was just apparent for a long time that there was very little knowledge and a lot of misinformation about Saudi Arabia, while at the same time the country is one of our most important allies." "Americans have no idea what the rest of the country looks like or that it is varied and that it is complex and that it is made up of a lot of different people," said Franklin-Trout.

She added, "Most importantly they have no sense of the culture and consequently the perspective and priorities and the values of the Saudi Arabians today and I think that that has led to some enormous misunderstandings which are serious." She noted that her concepts of the Kingdom and its people were relatively accurate as a result of contact through her job as producer for the past six years in charge of coverage of the White House, Congress, the Middle East, and defense for Public Broadcasting TV.

Franklin-Trout, who will leave shortly for Washington D.C. where she will edit the documentary, said she was most impressed during her travels here "at the incredible amount of work that has been done in a short span of time — It just frankly is impressive beyond words." Of the Kingdom's rapid development, she said, "It's never been done anywhere in such a speed. It certainly wasn't done in the United States."

She said she was looking for signs of possible strains on the Kingdom as a result of fast industrial development and social changes, but she noted that the Saudi Arabians appear to be easily absorbing the changes. "It really just floors you when you think through clearly from where they came from to where they are today," She said. "I was surprised at how little disturbed the people seem to be, actually I would have to say they seem to be absorbing it astoundingly well. I wonder if we (Americans) would have done as well," she said.

The television producer, who has covered Iran and its revolution, said she saw little correlation between the development and subsequent revolution in Iran and the development in the Kingdom. "In Iran the only hope was how fast we can eradicate the past and instal Westernization, and in Saudi Arabia I don't think they are looking for Westernization and they certainly are not looking to eradicate the past. They seem to like certain elements of modernization and industrialization but there is a very strong feeling and efforts that go along with it to maintain their identity, their past and their culture."

"They do not want to be like Westerners and I think that's quite excellent — it amounts to stability," Franklin-Trout said. The producer said she was also impressed by "the fascinating way in which the Royal family and the government keep in touch at a very level with the populace everyday. It is unlike anything I've seen anywhere else."

either in the West or in other Middle East countries."

"Today it's quite refreshing," she said commenting about grass roots access to the government, adding, "we could use a little more of that in the United States." During the filming in the Kingdom, Franklin-Trouit and her film crew spent some time with bedouin, farmer, and merchant families and talked with men and women at all levels of Saudi society.

The producer said she was also impressed by the progress of women in the Kingdom. And she observed, "I think there is an element that is greatly misunderstood in America. I don't think Saudi women want to be like Western women and I think Western women have a tendency to believe that surely they would like to be exactly like us and their problem is simply to catch up.

"I don't think that's true. I think Saudi women see a lot that they do not like the Western women's life, that they would not like to imitate and in fact feel very strongly about the lack of family structure in the United States." She said she discovered that many of the Saudi men and women she met were "appalled at the sort of disintegrated family structure in the United States and they feel it leads to some very unhappy people and very shaky values. I think it's a very interesting message that they have to deliver back to the U.S. on that account."

The three-part documentary dealing in aspects of history and culture, life in the Kingdom today, and Saudi Arabia in international economic and politics, is expected to air this fall on public television. The documentary, made and shown as a result of financial assistance from the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Texas Instruments, Ford Motor Company and the Harris Corporation, will be made available to international television networks and to colleges and universities after its debut in the U.S.

OPPOSITION STUDENTS MEET IN MANCHESTER

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19-25 Jan 81 pp 14-15

[Article by Jamal Isma'il: "Sudanese Students at Manchester University Commemorate Sudanese Independence Day; Ahmad Khayr Says: Sudan Today is Suffering Ten Times as Much as it Suffered Under Occupation; Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin Says: We Have Arms and Do Not Believe in Coups or Assassination"]

[Text] To mark the 25th anniversary of Sudan's independence, the Sudanese Students Association at the University of Manchester sponsored a political symposium which featured lawyer Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin, representing the Democratic Unionist Party, and the well-known Sudanese struggler, lawyer Ahmad Khayr, who was the first advocate of the establishment of the Graduates Congress in 1937. The symposium was attended by several Sudanese political figures and a number of Sudanese and Arab students in British universities.

Speaking at the outset of the 3-hour symposium, Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin noted that the independence which Sudan achieved on 1 January, 1956, was truncated to a certain extent because it was attained by diplomatic means and through negotiation between the British government and the Egyptian Republic. Under the agreement which led to independence, he recalled, there was a transitional period of 2 years after which a referendum was held on the question of whether to be independent or unite with Egypt. The Sudanese people chose independence. He pointed out that the manner in which Sudan acquired its independence has stumped the popular revolution in Sudan and enabled some supporters of colonialism to infiltrate political parties and ascend to power without having to offer any sacrifices. He said that when the government of the late Isma'il al-Azhari assumed power, it could not survive for more than 6 months because of a number of factors and circumstances which led to divisions within that government and its eventual collapse. It was succeeded for a while by a government of the 'Ummah Party before the coup of Ibrahim 'Abbud.

Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin explained the circumstances which prevailed during the period in which martyr Isma'il al-Azhari's government assumed power after independence. He said that Sudan was under the rule of British occupation and martial law regulations from 1898 until 1954 and that the Sudanese people suffered all kinds of political, social and economic suppression during colonial times. Education was highly restricted and on a low level, the press was under severe restrictions and the country's economic institutions as well as the people's means of livelihood were in the hands of the colonialists. When independence was declared, divisions

began to plague the National Unionist Party for the aforementioned reasons. The divisions weakened the national movement. The 'Ummah Party government which succeeded the government of martyr Ima'il al-Azhari could not maintain its hold on power because it lacked a political and social program. Eventually, independence lost its meaning and its historical and social substance.

After pointing out that independence is not a science but positive action aimed at change and at transition from one historical phase to another, Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin spoke about the military coup which brought 'Abbud to power. He then turned to the October popular revolution which toppled the military regime, saying that the October revolution was not the result of action by any particular party but a spontaneous uprising by the masses of Sudan and the capital, Khartoum. The revolution brought in a coalition government made up of various Sudanese parties in accordance with a charter of alliance.

Zayn al-'Abidin emphasized that when the Democratic Unionist Party came to power it established the foundations of democracy, social justice and public freedoms at home. In its foreign policies, the party adopted the principles of positive neutrality and active participation in the free Arab camp. He also explained that the party wanted to make sure that Sudan's independence was real and free of foreign associations. The Democratic Unionist Party also expanded the scope of education, increased the number of schools and universities and increased the number of educated citizens at home and the number of educational missions and students sent abroad for higher education. It gave the people doses of democracy, the opposition became part of the government, trade unions were established and the party began to reconstitute its popular base and grassroots. Furthermore, the party issued agrarian reform laws and reinforced the national industry and economic development.

He then turned to the May military coup which brought Nimayri to power, saying that the present regime has pushed Sudan backwards and reinstituted suppression and search measures and procedures. As a result, prisons filled up with political detainees who were and still are subjected to various forms of terror and torture. He also said that Nimayri, immediately after his advent to power, sought revenge against all the political forces and movements in Sudan, including some of those who helped him grab power. He was referring to the Sudanese Communist Party. He said that the rest of the parties joined the opposition immediately and that Nimayri later liquidated the leaders of the Sudanese CP.

About the Sudanese opposition, Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin said that the Moslem Brotherhood and Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi have reached reconciliation with the Nimayri regime without consulting the other opposition parties, and that the Democratic Unionist Party has rejected and continues to reject any reconciliation with the regime unless the regime agrees by a number of conditions. These include demands that the reconciliation be public and in writing, that emergency laws and the Socialist Union be abolished and that freedoms be reinstated. There are other conditions which would cumulatively guarantee that Sudan would return to the national democratic line in its domestic and foreign policies.

After referring to the political and economic conditions in which Sudan is now living under the rule of the Nimayri regime, Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin called on the Sudanese people to stop working and to declare a political strike in view of the deteriorating conditions in Sudan. He said that the present regime is a weak regime which is liable to collapse at any moment. It is a regime that cannot stand in the face of a popular revolution like the October revolution. He pointed out that one of the most important accomplishments of the opposition Democratic Unionist Party was to break the monopoly of arms for the army, and said that armed Sudanese opposition should be side by side with the political opposition at home.

After that Zayn al-'Abidin answered questions from the floor. He was followed by the prominent political figure, Ahmad Khayr, who was received with long applause and jubilation. Khayr spoke briefly but comprehensively about the social, economic and political conditions which have been deteriorating daily under the rule of President Ja'far al-Nimayri. He said that the Sudanese people are today suffering ten times as much as they suffered during the rule of Britain. The conditions of Sudan today, he said, would put British colonialism to shame. As for the way out of that, the Sudanese struggler said that revolutions are not subject to ready-made solutions and that an explosion is bound to happen in Sudan, because real change cannot take place without sacrifices and without joint efforts.

Khayr ended his speech by addressing the Sudanese students and likening them to the disciples of Martin Luther who carried out the reformation. He told them: "You will carry the message by a mandate that rises in its vigor and commitment to the level of religious belief."

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SUGAR GROWERS' STRIKE HIGHLIGHTS PROBLEMS IN SUGAR INDUSTRY

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 25, 26 Jan 81

[Article by Usamah Sayyid 'Abd-al-Aziz]

[25 Jan 81, p 5]

[Text] The "owners" of the sugar farms which supply the al-Junayd sugar mill struck just when 20,000 feddans of sugar cane planted during the December-June season were ready for harvesting and pressing. They raised their voices, shouting, "We have guarded our farms with peaceful means and firearms throughout the 4-day strike, and we are determined that not a single stalk of sugar will be harvested until our demands are met!"

We sought an explanation of these demands which detonated the world of sugar's first strike. The agricultural director said, "We are busy drawing up a new production relations law, so that we shall never again get into the strike game."

Therefore, we also must ask about the old production relations law--if one exists--and how effective it is.

We lived through the 4 costly days which cost the Sudan 10,400 sacks of sugar. We did not stop with investigating the strike and how it was handled, because it was more important that we find out why there was a strike, and whether the al-Junayd farms were the only trouble spots in all the sugar groves.

Therefore, the strike was an excuse for us to investigate the sugar groves of al-Junayd, al-Qariyah, West Sannar, and 'Aslayah, and the al-Junayd project headquarters near the Khartoum Zoo.

The al-Junayd sugar project covers a total area of 37,000 feddans, and includes 25 villages: Rifa'a, al'Hilaliyah, al-Buwayda', Wad al-Sayyid, al-'Azabiyah, al-Junayd, Wad Ghaluqah, al-Jaqubab, al-Ghanumab, al-Hujaylij, al-Talhah, Baranku, Wad al-Fadl, al-Maghadid, al-'Usayn Adam, Al-Daym, Ilyas, Wad al-'Asha', al-'Akk Jad, al-Rabb, and al-Hudur.

The project consists of a mill and a farm, worked by 2,243 farmers who have a union whose acting president is al-Amin Umar al-Tay, who told us, "This region

has a long agricultural history, starting with the al-Jazirah project, where we planted cotton as a basic crop and vegetables as a quick financial return commodity. We also planted sorghum as a food staple for ourselves and our livestock.

"When the sugar project was established, we were told to plant only sugar. Our troubles began with the second season, since we were absolutely forbidden to plant peanuts, a source of rapid financial return. The tragedy continued when most of the auxiliary equipment stopped working because of a lack of spare parts. Even so, they were primitive equipment not in keeping with our needs. A fire in the irrigation pumps led to a scarcity of water needed for cultivation and an overgrowth of grasses.

"Therefore, we warned the officials to reduce the cultivated area and show more concern for it. On this basis, we prepared a study intended to raise the national revenue and the gross national product by improving the farmers' incomes.

"In another context, mosquitos became more numerous and troublesome, and formed a hostile front, adding malaria to chronic bilharzia. Faced with this threat, we kept our children away from this brackish swamp to protect them.

"The only alternative is more manpower, and consequently more expenses, which raises production costs."

We Won't Sell It For Nothing

He said, "After all these tribulations, we shall never agree to sell the sugar for nothing. The mill buys a ton of sugar cane from us for 4.5 Sudanese pounds, and each ton yields a full 100-kilogram sack of sugar. Keep in mind that when the project began, the price of a ton of cane was 3.5 pounds. We used to plant a shoot for 2 piasters and cut it for 3 piasters, whereas today we plant one for 20 piasters and cut it for 40 piasters.

"For all these reasons, we considered not harvesting and selling this season's crop. This came as no surprise to the officials, for we had presented our demands to the industry minister during his visit to the project on 1 November 1980. At that time he delegated the sugar and sugar refining organization director and the project director to resolve these demands."

Let me refer here to an official in the al-Jazirah electricity section, who explained that the electricity allocated to the region is not enough for the al-Junayd mill's needs, not to mention the other mills in the region such as Nasij, al-Hasahisa, and Kubur.

Duplication of Responsibility Is an Effort

Mr al-Tay ended his statement by saying, "Therefore we are renewing our appeal for the formation of a specialized commission to discuss the project's various shortcomings such as electricity, gasoline, equipment, spare parts and irrigation. The clashes among ministries--Industry, Irrigation, Power and Finance--fighting over our farms must be broken up, because we are the victims of this fighting.

"The responsibilities of the sugar and sugar refining organization, and the jurisdictions of the mill's management, must be defined, because coexistence has proven that these authorities have failed to fulfil their obligations towards us, which gives us the feeling that the future is cloudy and that upheaval is certain to come."

He added, "We are soldiers who work in silence to advance our project, and we know that our silence has its limits and our work has its principles. Therefore, we have demanded that the state subsidy to us be raised from 28 pounds to 33 pounds a month per farm. The sugar organization director just recently agreed to this demand, as well as to our other demands, out of his belief that we are beset by harsh conditions.

"But we have every right to ask why this response was delayed, thereby forcing us into a dead end leading only to damage to the national economy."

Emigrants From the Land

Assistant Director General of Agriculture Mustafa Muhammad Jibra'il explained that each farm has 15 feddans, one-third of which is fallow. The rest is planted in equal amounts with the new sugar crop and first and second growth vegetables. The scarcity of water has led to leaving the areas allocated for vegetables unplanted.

He said, "This year 11,000 feddans have been planted with sugar cane. If we had known that production of electricity at al-Damazin would drop, and that therefore our six electric pumps would stop working and we would be forced to use two diesel pumps, we would have reduced the amount of land we planted.

"If we had known that our wells would fail, we would have planted less land, even though this step would cause the following future problems: increased blackening [tafahhum] in the sugar cane, and a drop in sugar production.

"Our thinking is still governed by the observation that we are producing a vital staple which must be available to everyone at all times, no matter where they are in 1 million square miles."

Mustafa lamented, "I tell you in all truthfulness that the farmers are hampered, because agricultural labor is migrating or emigrating overseas. As a result, more than a third of the plots are managed by women and cultivated by children and young people. The human element is extremely important in such projects, even mechanized projects. Science says that machines contribute 30 to 40 percent of the quality of the produce, while the human element contributes 70 percent, through effort, control and good supervision.

"Because of this migration, good land has been neglected and grasses have taken over much of it. If we compare this with another statement which says that the region has a 26-year agricultural history, this means that the roots of the grasses go deep into the earth, and that eliminating them on the surface is similar to treating people with sedatives and narcotics. In order to uproot the grass, huge machinery like the Caterpillar D-8 tractors, which can till to a depth of 50 inches as well as tilling lightly, and can break up clods and penetrate the soil, will have to be imported.

"Attachments to this machine, such as the AB-6 and the AB-20, can be used to prepare the soil for planting and open up drainage ditches.

"If we had seven of these gigantic machines, the face of the project would certainly be changed, production would double, and the farmers would regain their peace of mind and their scattered strength."

A New Production Relation

The agricultural director said, "These are the ugly facts about the shortages, common to the farmers and the mill management alike.

"Therefore, we have made an effort to draw up new laws and statutes. We will form a joint commission of farmers, the sugar organization, and the mill management in order to draw up a new production relation law.

"We are fully convinced that this law will give every person his full rights, and will outline everyone's duties. We might formulate a system for calculating the sugar content of the canes, in return for the farmer's cutting the canes and putting them in special trains for transport to the mill, which would help reduce the amount of crushed canes.

"We are eager to participate in enacting this law, because the land belongs to the farmers, who have agreed to provide us with a raw material which we will convert into a vital national commodity."

The Blackened Sugar

The acting head of the al-Junayd sugar farmer federation eloquently described the bitterness of the sugar, and added, "We plant two kinds of canes--CO-527 and NCO-310.

"The first type has a lower sugar content than the second type, but is more resistant to the blackening disease, which hits the growing tips of the 310 cane, which has a higher sugar content.

"Therefore, the first type has come to make up 60 percent of the planted area, with the second type accounting for 40 percent.

"Nevertheless, the average yield per feddan is 2.8 tons of sugar. If we eliminated the disease and perfected the other agricultural operations, we would certainly get 4 tons of sugar from each feddan."

The Production Lie

We stopped a young, eager farmer named Jad al-Karim Muhammad al-Hasan and talked with him. He said, "On this project, our future is cloudy, and what we get from it does not satisfy our ambitions. Therefore, emigration has infiltrated our ranks. One indication will suffice to prove the blackness of the future: the end of any return on production. In 1975, production was promising, averaging 71 tons

of sugar cane. Then the count began going backwards in a baffling manner, like a leap backwards; production figures dropped to 40 tons, then 30 tons, and then finally 20 tons.

"We had no part in this--it was because of the state sugar and sugar refining organization. There are many examples showing the truth of this, but just one will suffice. We complained to the minister of Industry, who, to give him his due, delegated the director general of the organization and the mill's director general to look into our complaints. That very day, the chairman of the board told us, 'If you agree to last year's agreement, I will sign it with you right away.'

"Obviously, we refused, because to approve the previous agreement would mean that we had no cause, whereas we had our stand and our just demand.

"Significantly, he told us, 'Bring me your amendment of last year's agreement.' When we finished the amendment and brought it to the project's director general, he suggested that we keep on working and producing, so that our production would allow the amendment to be passed.

"Unfortunately, the response came after a 4-day work stoppage, and thus the country lost thousands of pounds."

A Project Without a Study

Director General of the al-Junayd Project Khidr Muhammad Nur says, "There are many solutions to the question of improving production, but there is only one ideal solution which is the shortest road most convincing to all parties: that we differentiate between the good and the poor farmers, so as to convince the first to maintain their quality and the second to strive to equal the first.

"Such a classification must be followed up by motivating the workers to continue working--especially since we produced 55,000 tons of sugar which would be increased by planting 20,000 feddans of sugar cane this year. But there was a water shortage which affected the regularity of irrigation, followed by a 4-day strike by the farmers.

"No one can claim that the farmers don't have a cause, but it is more sensible to say that I am not the one who can solve this issue."

He said, "As for other provocative issues such as the blackening of the sugar cane, the limited economic benefit of the rate of juice extraction from the cane, and the sugar content of current juices, I must say that essentially this project was built without a feasibility study. Nonetheless, it has been very productive in comparison with world production, and when the blackening appeared, our will was not paralyzed and we did not give in to it. Instead, we planted a type of cane which does not blacken, and at the same time we conducted serious studies on overcoming this disease.

"We, in solidarity with all the workers on this project, want to achieve a miracle by maintaining our production in spite of the most violent cumulative, unforeseen problems."

Let me stress that all these peoples' remarks revealed marvellous feats and warned against many of the evils threatening the position of the sugar mills.

The Subsequent Investigation

The incidents which took place later almost transformed and defaced the project, but its senility is due to age, not introversion or collapse.

From here, we went to the newer mills and gathered the bare facts, the end result of which was several questions for the acting director of the sugar and sugar refining organization.

[26 Jan 81, p 6]

[Text] The al-Junayd sugar farmers' complaints revealed the ugly side of the sugar groves and brought up the use of pressure in resolving demands. The way they were handled revealed the management's shortcomings when it came to drawing up sound bases for production, and the evils surrounding al-Junayd certainly apply, in different forms, to the newer mills. These facts were explained in the working paper of the central committee of the food and sugar industries employees' union, which met from 3 to 5 January. The paper said, "The industrial sector is following a remote whim which will lead to a gloomy grave. Every day that it continues along that road, all the efforts and all the sweat--even blood--that flows are worthless as long as no production results from them." This responsible statement leads us to ask when production began to decline, who is guiding this course so conspiratorial to the national economy, and whose interest is served by this plot.

President of the General Union of Food and Sugar Industries' Employees Kamal al-Din 'Abbes says, "When the al-Junayd mill started up in 1964, its agricultural director was Muhammad al-Ghali Sulayman, and his deputy was Muhammad al-Bashir al-Waqi', who transferred to the agricultural department of the Halfa al-Jadidah mill. In 1971, after both men returned from Germany, al-Ghali became the director at Halfa and al-Waqi' became the director at al-Junayd. Then al-Waqi' was chosen to be director of the State Sugar and Sugar Refining Organization, and al-Ghali became director of both mills! In 1974-75, al-Ghali was appointed director of the West Sannar sugar mill, in addition to his post at the general foodstuffs organization, and the sugar organization's financial director was promoted to general director. After al-Waqi's death, al-Ghali was appointed acting director of the State Sugar and Sugar Refining Organization, in addition to his position with the food industries organization.

"This shifting around created rapid promotions for the deputy directors, who became mill directors. Each one of them started out by following the previous director's course, which was distinguished by a spirit of disregarding and exceeding their powers. A cold, fierce wind blew which made all the directors try to legitimize themselves even if that necessitated stripping the organization of all its jurisdictions and transforming it into an authority in name alone.

"This struggle confirmed a fact which prevailed for 2 years: the management's failure and inability to resolve any problems.

"Next came total disregard for the opinion of the organizations representing the workers, thereby overthrowing the May slogan 'partners, not measures.'

"The managements were unable to rally the workers around a single, definite, sacred goal--production. This failure culminated this year, when an estimated 40,000 feddans were to have been planted to produce 200,000 tons of sugar cane. But the fact remains that so far only 7,000 feddans have been planted on all four farms subordinate to the four mills.

"The picture becomes extremely gloomy when we learn that the end of December is the cut-off date for planting. Steps must be taken to plant the rest of the area; even though it would not give the anticipated results, it would certainly reduce the cost of importing sugar from overseas, considering the insane rise in world sugar prices.

"All these points have a single, common result--the killing of motivation.

"This is not a rhetorical statement; it derives from the current planting shortfall, which amounts to more than 30,000 feddans. The reason for this is the lack of liquidity, which logic dictates must be available so that the state does not have to pay in hard currency. The reason for the lack of liquidity is said to be differences of opinion among officials. The national well being requires that these disputes be resolved immediately."

Incentives to Reduce Production

He says, "Without going into the details, let me say that the sugar industry cannot realize any profit at the prices set by the state, whereas the facts show that this is the only Sudanese industry which could achieve a real profit compared to world sugar prices.

"These profits have led officials to consider increasing production by drawing up laws to give incentives to the workers, on the condition that they increase sugar production 20 percent over what it was last season.

"If we did not trust this group's overflowing patriotic zeal, we would say that there is no way the workers can be sure of obtaining these incentives except by reducing production to the minimum, and then raising it gradually according to a percentage which would grant them the maximum incentives, equivalent to 3 week's salary.

"There is something else unjust about defining a maximum for the incentives, since the workers have acquired the right to receive an incentive of approximately 3 months salary upon achieving record production. But this year it was decided to pay only 2 months' salary.

"Therefore, we say that it is essential to draw up guidelines which will take into consideration all the factors surrounding this organization's production, so that the incentives can achieve their purpose."

Unilateral Opinion Is an Error

Let us go back to the working paper of the central committee of the food and sugar industries employees. We read, "It is now clear that the loud voices which we raised in March 1970, to warn about the situation in the sugar sector, have not found an attentive ear, and that the failure and lack of success which we anticipated has become fact.

"Let us refer to some of the main topics which we believe are the immediate cause of what is happening.

"We stress that we were not officially informed of the last 6-month schedule, and that it was not offered to us for discussion or even examination.

"The organization decided that 160,000 tons of sugar would be produced this season, 50,000 tons of which would be produced during the final 2 months of the 6-month program ending on 31 December 1980. The organization's failure to produce, and its inability to even provide enough empty sacks to package half this amount, became obvious when the schedule expired.

"This inability may perhaps give us some indication of the organization's failure to provide spare parts, chemicals, equipment, and transportation."

The Frantic Power Struggle

Secretary of the Sugar Sector and Commissioner of the Halfa al-Jadidah sugar mill al-Tahir Sayyid Ahmad al-Sahaykh told AL-AYYAM, "Right now the sugar sector owes 40 million pounds, of which about 2.5 million pounds are paid each year as interest to the banks. Last season showed a deficit of 14 million pounds.

"From another angle, the organization received 15 million pounds from the state, and it is expected to produce 18 million pounds, i.e. a surplus of 3 million pounds. This is barely enough for salaries, let alone other operational requirements."

He said, "The most important thing affecting work and hampering production is the frantic struggle going on on the organization's leadership level, which has caused the organization to pile up behind this person or that one. We at the central committee of the employees' union demand that a conference including all parts of the organization be held, so that the reasons for the struggle can be eliminated if possible or the elements causing it can be excised if necessary. This power struggle is affecting the engineers, who are packing their suitcases and emigrating. All one has to do is look around to see the vast numbers who have migrated within the last 2 years.

"Although the organization is opposed to the enormous wave of migration which will deprive it of its expertise, it did not appoint a single graduate engineer all last year.

"It is painfully paradoxical that many useless workers have been appointed, at a time when overemployment has brought about a common conviction that there should

be no more appointments. This paradox has virtually transformed the organization into a welfare project.

"The worst thing is that individual promotions take place without any justification. This kills the competitive spirit and nullifies self-sacrifice, while simultaneously delaying cases which deserve promotion. The following is an example of this.

"Last April the organization's director approved the promotion of an al-Junayd project employee whose name was not on the list sent by the al-Junayd director to the organization's director for approval. This employee's promotion actually went through, while the director did not approve the al-Junayd list. Consequently, the al-Junayd project director announced his employees' promotions.

"During his visit to the Halfa al-Jadidah sugar mill, the organization's director announced the promotion of some of the employees. Actually, it was his duty to only approve the promotions, which the mill director should announce.

"These promotions resulted in complaints by some sugar industry experts, who granted them 10 days' vacations until the matter of their own promotions was looked into.

"All of this activity has been accompanied by unsatisfactory distribution of the labor force. We now find a Grade Seven mechanical engineer with a post-graduate degree in sugar engineering and more than 10 years experience holding the position of agricultural workshop director, while another mill is in urgent need of his expertise.

"People are hired into the organization in an unmethodical, illogical manner, as the following example shows: Grade Eleven, equivalent to Grade B, was given to an employee who was Grade C before his appointment.

"From the above, one can conclude that allowances and raises are handed out like gifts, not like rights granted to induce good work."

An Interview With the Director General

I changed all the shouting, most of the complaining and some of the accusations into definite questions for Acting Director General of the Sugar and Sugar Refining Organization Muhammad al-Ghali Sulayman. I was told that he was not in his office.

The al-Junayd farmers' strike was being brought up before the People's Assembly that day, so I excused him.

I telephoned three times that day to find out whether he was in his office, so I could visit him, but without success, for he was either out of the office or in one meeting after another.

On Saturday 3 January I decided to settle the matter through the organization's public relations office. I was welcomed by the head of the office, who went

with me to the director's office. We learned that he was not there and might not come in at all that day.

Nevertheless, I stationed myself in the courtyard of the organization until 1100, at which time Muhammad al-Ghali Sulayman arrived. We had the following dialog.

[Question] Good morning, Mr Ghali. (More sharply) Good morning. I am Usamah Sayyid, from AL-AYYAM.

[Answer] (abruptly) I don't talk to journalists, for I am a very busy man of few words.

[Question] This is different, because my talk with you will deal with the reasons for the decline in your organization's production and its growing problems, which have caused us to open a file on the Sudanese sugar industry. Some people in your department have told us things which will not please you, and we, as an information organization, are concerned with getting the facts to the reader. An interview with you will be the key to getting the truth.

[Answer] I said I would not talk. Those who have already talked can find the time for that. Also, I will not talk in the street.

[Question] I know that, Mr al-Ghali, and I do not intend to hold the interview now. I want to set a time for a press interview which will take only an hour of your time.

We had reached the elevator which he uses to get to his fourth-floor office. He raised the index finger of his right hand and said, "Don't try to ride with me. The elevator is for me alone."

I said, "Rest assured, I don't want to ride in the elevator."

I hope that you will bear with me now until Mr al-Ghali finds the time to answer the following questions, because his answers will give us the facts about his vital industry.

1. In your economic feasibility study of the sugar projects at al-Junayd and Halfa al-Jadidah, West Sannar and 'Aslayah, what was the feddan's productivity in tons of sugar cane? What was the area to be planted? What area was actually planted, and how much does the feddan actually produce? Who is responsible for the non-achievement of the figures included in the feasibility study?
2. What rates did the feasibility studies for each mill set for the extraction of juice from the sugar cane, and what percentage has actually been attained?
3. What is the present sugar concentration of the juices?
4. How many farmers work on each project? Is there a plan to mechanize the projects to reduce the number of workers and thus lower costs?

5. What are the wages and benefits of the farmers, the administrators and the specialists?
6. How much does a ton of sugar cost at each project?
7. Was there a feasibility study for the al-Junayd project? If so, did it refer to the possibilities of sugar cane disease through swelling [tadakhkhum]. If the study made no such reference, how did the disease arise and why?
8. Doesn't your decision to abolish cash advances for the al-Junayd farmers conflict with the jurisdictions of the finance and the industry ministers?
9. Are the promotions which occurred during your administration satisfactory and legitimate, and is everybody happy with them? What are your powers as former director of sugar projects? Does any present director have the same powers? Will the lack of such powers cause these projects to fail, or is the overstepping of your jurisdictions the reason for declining production?
10. Are these projects run by radio from Khartoum?
11. Is it true that the organization has no cash liquidity?
12. Much has been said about the shortages of machinery which help prepare the soil for cultivation, and this has been attributed to the lack of spare parts. Is this claim true?
13. Who distributes gasoline to the organization's vehicles and why?
14. Why are your mills still in the grip of the state electricity authority? That is, wouldn't it be better for you and the Sudanese economy if you had reserve generators at each project?

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SULTANATE OF OMAN

PFLO REGAINING MOMENTUM AFTER 1975-1976 SETBACK

Aden SAWT AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 1 Feb 81 p 4

[Interview with 'Abd al-Hafiz Jum'an, Member of the Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the PFLO, Date and Place Not Given]

[Text] The Omani arena is currently witnessing profound changes in the course of the national liberation struggle being waged by the Omani popular masses under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) to eliminate completely the regime of Qabus, the lackey, and to put an end to his national and pan-Arab betrayals, his repeated calls to establish dubious alliances in the Gulf area and his allowing Oman to be used for the establishment of imperialist military bases there.

In view of these developments, AL-HADAF had an interview with Comrade 'Abd al-Hafiz Jum'an, a member of the PFLO Central Executive Committee and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, during which the following dialogue ensued:

[Question] American bases are spreading throughout the region and the reactionary regime in Oman has offered Omani territory for bases for American forces. How do you see best to block these bases and what dangers do they pose for the Omani people and the people of the area?

[Answer] Oman in fact is characterized by an extremely important strategic location since the Strait of Hormuz, the vitally important waterway for the transit of oil tankers, and the Omani island of Masirah are the best proof of Oman's importance to the imperialist forces. Our country is the object of attention of these hostile forces because of the aspirations and ambitions of the peoples, not to mention the as yet undiscovered immense mineral, agricultural and fish resources contained by Omani territory, in addition to the fact that it is adjacent to Gulf oil countries and because of the existence of vast interests of the imperialist forces and their monopolistic companies which exploit the wealth of these countries.

On this basis, international imperialism, led by the United States, is attaching particular importance to Oman. We see British imperialism with a tight grasp upon our country from the time of colonization until the present. Its long-lived military presence in our country grows more concentrated day by day, and its conspiracy against our people through its backing of its artificial regime in our

country clearly shows that it is not prepared to let our people exercise self-determination. The British military presence has gone beyond a direct and overt military presence since, by tightening its grasp on our country, Britain has now become the ruler of everything, big and small, and is the actual ruler of Oman while the Sultan's government is nothing more than a shadow government. After the fall of the bygone regime of the shah and the victory of young Iranian revolutionary forces, American imperialism began to feel a threat looming over its interests and no longer had confidence in the ability of its agents to stand fast in the face of the winds of change blowing in the area. The Iranian revolution had upset the balance of power in the area. The Omani revolution had stood firm despite the setback in 1975-1976. There were the successes and achievements of the progressive regime in the PDRY and the foiling of all the conspiracies which were hatched against it, domestically and externally. There were the victories achieved daily by the Ethiopian people plus the struggles being waged by patriotic and democratic forces in the Gulf and peninsula. All these positive changes in fact had their effect and startled imperialism and its puppets in the area. This made it commence its repeated threats to occupy the sources of oil under untenable slogans about preserving its vital interests from threats and some imaginary Soviet intervention in order to cover up its ugly aggressive acts, to isolate the Arab peoples from their real friends, to threaten stability and security in this area, and in a worst, throughout the whole world. Things did not stop there and American imperialism put its threats into practice by sending its war fleets to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The concentrated American military presence is now deployed in an unprecedented fashion in Oman. The present regime in our country is fully prepared to open the doors of Oman to American troops, and to create aggressive bases to threaten the security and stability of the area. The lackey regime in Muscat is the only regime in the area that pursues its betrayals to this extent and is prepared to transform Oman into a center of aggression against the peoples of the area. This willingness is embodied in its signing of a military treaty with the United States on 4 June 1980, that treaty that gave American imperialism the right to aggressive bases on Omani territory. The United States proceeded to build its military bases on Masirah and Ra's Musandum and, with the British fleets, completed its control over the Strait of Hormuz and redoubled its naval, air and land presence. Besides this presence, the American forces, to be more precise, the Marines, began their work side by side with the British forces in combing the countryside of Dhofar to battle the Omani rebels. This American military presence will be challenged by launching struggles in a multitude of forms and, essentially, by depending on the Omani masses and mobilizing and rousing them and inciting them to launch the necessary political, military and union struggles, including protests, demonstrations, strikes and proclamations of rejection of these bases and this aggressive presence.

Given the dangers facing our country and the huge imperialist military presence in our area, we in the PFLO feel that it is of considerable importance to win over all Omani patriots, tribal shaykhs, clerics and other citizens of Oman to resist these bases on the basis of three demands:

1. Removal of all imperialist forces from Oman.
2. Pursuing a policy of nonalignment, opposition to the Camp David agreements and support for the Palestinian revolution.
3. Granting of public freedoms and democracy and release of all political prisoners.

The imperialist military presence that controls the straits and vital corridors in the area allows its monopolistic companies to continue to loot the wealth of the peoples of the area and to conspire against the nationalist and progressive regimes and patriotic and democratic forces throughout the area of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. The imperialist military presence in this rich and sensitive part of the world not only threatens the peace and security of the Omani people but has really begun to pose a genuine threat to the peace and security of the area and the world as a whole.

Therefore, all patriotic and democratic forces in the Gulf and Peninsula area must consolidate all their efforts to eliminate the threats facing them and their security and the peace of their territory through rising to collective action and create effective coordination to rout the arrogance of the United States, check its aggression and remove its bases from the area. If we in fact recognize that it is the peoples of the area who are most concerned with opposing this aggressive presence, all revolutionary parties and organizations in our country must exert maximum efforts: to mobilize the masses and make them understand the facts, expose those who cooperate with the enemies of the people and strengthen their relations with the progressive Arab regimes and revolutionary Arab parties and organizations, particularly strengthening their struggle-oriented relations with the Palestinian revolution, stressing the need to develop the relations of the nationalist and democratic forces in the Gulf and Peninsula with the bloc of socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union. We will thereby, in fact, be able to rout our imperialist and reactionary enemies. Let it be absolutely clear that we are firmly convinced that achieving our people's yearnings for full independence and freedom can only be accomplished by bringing down and removing the lackey regime.

[Question] Since all the traitorous positions of the lackey al-Qabus regime are creating a fertile foundation for you to escalate your struggle against it, how are you exploiting these circumstances and how would you evaluate your struggle-related activity in this regard?

[Answer] The betrayals of the lackey al-Qabus regime are not the product of this period of time in fact since he has been committing treason ever since the British put him on the throne and the Omani people in particular. The Arab peoples and the world as a whole remember the betrayals and follies committed against the Omani people by this regime, whether by approving the British military presence, by renewing the treaties of bondage which his forefathers signed with Britain, by welcoming the Iranian invasion of Oman in the era of the shah or by his repeated calls for establishing dubious alliances in the Gulf in the name of Gulf security and his proposal that the capitalist countries of the West participate in this notorious, evil alliance. It is in fact al-Qabus who is now crowning his betrayals by approving the treasonous Camp David agreements and rejecting the decisions of the Arab summit conferences, by his warm relations with the al-Sadat regime and, finally, by giving America the right to establish military bases in Oman, as we mentioned in our response to the first question. Our people have been fighting on this basis since the outbreak of its revolution in 1975 and is still doing so, backed by all forces of good, to put an end to this treason and to restore Oman to its proper position to share in the Arab liberationist struggle effectively and

honorably. The open, and repeated betrayals by the Muscat regime have made our task of arousing our popular masses less complicated and, from another angle, have expanded the social base of the revolution and provided broader opportunities to push the regime into an ever narrower corner domestically and externally, the aspects which the revolution is working to exploit in order to develop.

[Question] The PLFO has not held a general congress for some years. Are there any arrangements to do so?

[Answer] The front's general national congress is normally held every 3 years in normal circumstances. The last national congress held by the front was in 1974. This means that it should have been followed by a congress in 1977. However, you will certainly acknowledge that armed action was hit by a temporary setback in late 1975 and early 1976 and this setback had widespread effects on the front on all political, ideological, organizational and military aspects. In return, it also posed a historic opportunity to review and make an exhaustive and critical study of every past experience and, consequently, to emerge with a transition program that would define fundamental tasks during the transition period; to deal with and evolve the revolution's own circumstances in light of the lessons of the past revealed by experience from oversights and errors as well as gains and positive aspects of our combat work.

This is really the essential factor behind delaying the general national congress so far since, in our view, the congress had to be convened in the proper political and organizational climate on all levels to ensure that it would produce sound results and decisions.

Work has now begun to prepare for the congress, a central preparatory committee having been formed. This committee has begun its meetings and when the committee finishes formulating the draft documents for the congress, these drafts will first be put up for debate and dialogue in all organizational frameworks of the front.

[Question] In 1976, you experienced a temporary military setback and then you laid down a struggle-oriented program for self-rebuilding. After 4 years, how would you evaluate your application of this program with regard to what has and what has not been accomplished?

[Answer] Before talking about the struggle-oriented program laid down by the central leadership to rebuild ourselves, we should talk, if only briefly, about the temporary military setback and its effect. The front was, in reality, hit with the military setback as the aftermath of an imperialist, reactionary superiority over it. History shows us that all revolutions have experienced victories, failures and setbacks and then were able to rise again and win final victory. In our opinion, there is no revolution on the face of the earth that has followed a straight path to victory without experiencing difficulties--undergoing setbacks and failures. We do not try to make people think that we feel that the military superiority over us was the only basic reason for the setback; rather, we acknowledge that we had many fundamental mistakes and oversights that, to a great extent, helped to create the setback. The program of the central leadership identified these shortcomings and faults throughout the previous period of struggle. While

the effects of the setback were great and although it created chaos in our ranks, cost us dear comrade fighters, led to the collapse of some fainthearted persons and caused them to fall aside and abandon the noble goals for which the revolution was launched and caused us to emerge from the setback loaded in fact with endless worries and problems—despite all this, I can say with all confidence that we have benefited greatly from our study of our struggling experiment as we derived a valuable set of rules and lessons. We truly learned the most important errors and negative aspects since we studied the experiences with awareness and objectivity in order to benefit from the positive and critically examine the negative aspects, to leave them behind forever. We view the rules and lessons we derived from our past experience as the theoretical guide for our work in the present and future. Over about 4 years of struggle under the reconstruction program, we have been able to graduate a large body of personnel in various political, organizational and military specialties, etc., and we have restored a great deal of our relationship and lines of contact with the masses. We have made progress in strengthening our organizational conditions. We now feel—and this is something fundamental—that internally within the framework of the front we now stand on a cohesive and firm ideological and organizational footing and within relationships that are moving forward toward an effective embodiment of the central democratic principles. All these issues and accomplishments will give us firm and sound bases for our combat work in all its political and military aspects.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

MEETING WITH ERITREAN OFFICIAL--Abu Dhabi, 15 Mar (QNA)--Ahmad Khalifah as-Suwaydi, the representative of his highness the UAE president, met today with Osman Saleh Sabbe, leader of the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces, who is currently visiting Abu Dhabi. Saleh Sabbe acquainted Ahmad Khalifah as-Suwaydi with the latest Eritrean political and military developments and with the efforts of the Arab League to unite the three factions of the Eritrean revolution at the meetings to begin in Tunis today under the patronage of the Arab league. [Text] [JN151547 Doha QNA in Arabic 1435 GMT 15 Mar 81]

LIBYAN MESSAGE CONVEYED--Abu Dhabi, 16 Mar (QNA)--The UAE president, his highness Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al Nuhayyan, has received a written message from Libyan President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi on current Arab issues, as well as bilateral relations and means to consolidate them. The message was conveyed by Muhammad al-Qamudi, director of the Libyan public relations office in Abu Dhabi, during his meeting with the UAE president here today. The meeting was attended by Ahmad Khalifah as-Suwaydi, the UAE president's advisor. [Text] [JN161015 Doha QNA in Arabic 0955 GMT 16 Mar 81]

OIL MINISTER IN RIYADH--Abu Dhabi, 17 Mar (GNA)--Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, UAE minister of petroleum and natural resources, left for Riyadh today to participate in the emergency meeting of the ministers of petroleum and natural resources of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. The ministers will discuss the latest developments in the world oil market and draw up a unified strategy in step with new facts on the market. The meeting comes at a time when reports and statements have been reiterated regarding a trend to reduce oil production so as to alleviate the expected surplus in the oil market, particularly in view of the possibility that a large part of the Iraqi and Iranian oil production might begin to flow anew to the international market. [Text] [JN170802 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0735 GMT 17 Mar 81]

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